RACE, CLASS AND CIVILIZATION: ON MUNFORD’S RACE AND REPARATIONS

Clarence J. Munford’s Race and Reparation: A Black Perspective for the 21st Century is important both for what it says and who says it. Munford is a major, if not well-known, historian of the African Diaspora. This work thinks in fundamental ways about race, class and civilization at the end of the twentieth century. It poses questions to which fundamental answers are sought. His previous work ranges from Production Relations, Class and Black Liberation (1978), through the three volumes The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1652-1715 (1991). In between Munford has published articles on major theoretical and ideological issues confronting the struggles for Black freedom in the US and Africa. Munford’s formal training is in Marxism and historical materialism, having received his doctorate from Karl Marx University in the former GDR. This grounding brings him into the same intellectual and ideological zone occupied by the innovative Guyanese scholar Walter Rodney. In this respect Munford’s work attempts to merge Marxism with the national emancipatory aims of Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora. Which is to say it asserts the centrality of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery to the rise of capitalism and the anti-slavery and national liberation struggles as central dimensions of world historic transformation. This stance is in opposition to positivist, critical and humanist Marxisms of Eastern and Western Europe. European Marxists have construed Marxism as an extension of Enlightenment philosophy and social theory1. Europe, therefore, is viewed as the center of human development. This tradition in Marxism was no where better articulated than by the leading thinkers of the German Social Democratic Party, especially Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstien.2 Marxist intellectuals like Maurice Dobb, moreover, conceptualized the emergence of capitalism in England as the outcome of completely internal social and economic dynamics, without reference to the international slave trade, slavery and colonialism. Critical and humanist Marxisms have focused on the European intellectual and psychological universes, with no recognition of anything non-European. The white intellectual and social universes, as a result, became the beginning and end of all things Marxist and all things revolutionary. However, the magnitude of the error of Eurocentrist Marxism is revealed when it is recognized that Europe itself and the white working class in particular are inconceivable outside of the context of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery. Specifically, the socio-historical and ideological emergence and construction of the white working class is predicated upon, and is predated by, modern chattel slavery and the construction of the global white supremacy system. Moreover, the spiritual and intellectual edifice of Europe is built upon a single ideological and philosophical purpose and foundation; the negation of Africa and blackness. Indeed, Europe, as it has come to be known, is inconceivable and cannot be explained or understood without reference to its non-European foundations, which are prior to it, and provided the material and spiritual conditions for its emergence.
Nineteenth century European socialists theoretically established the working class as the central revolutionary agency of modernity. And in so defining the working class and ascribing to it political and revolutionary potentialities, literally reinvented it. The proletariat as hegemon of world revolutionary transformation is, perhaps, the greatest theoretical achievement of European socialism. Munford (1996:153) suggests, however, that Lenin, of all Marxist of his time, understood that the white proletariat was civilizationally burdened by the baggage of white supremacy, itself the result of centuries of European oppression and exploitation of non-white peoples. On the other hand, Kautskyist Marxism turned the movement from insurrection to passivity and accommodation. Hence, it could grow and expand without posing the issue of radical change, thus either putting off to some future period, or totally revising, the idea of the proletariat as the agency of revolutionary change. Increasingly the SDP came to believe that capitalism would be able to restructure itself, continue to develop (with perhaps periodic, yet temporary crises) and extend its benefits to the working class. Eduard Bernstein eventually argued that human advance would occur through European capitalism; thus establishing the basis of an historic compromise between the European proletariat and bourgeoisie; a type of “end of history” through an end of the class struggle. By merging the working class movement with capitalism, racism and colonialism, the working class becomes a part of the global system of oppression based upon the color line. It is here worth noting that Du Bois’s (1915, 1925) concept of imperialism conceptualized a system whereby white workers viewed themselves as having a self-interest in colonialism, racism and wars of colonial suppression.
Munford in this current work presents us with an African centered philosophy of history and a theory of social and historical change rooted in Pan-African realities. In this regard, Munford strives to construct a philosophico-theoretical-ideological synthesis that inverts Eurocentrist social theory. He locates the central agency of historic change not in the European working class but the African, Asian and Latin American masses. In redefining the contending forces, naming them, deciding where the barricades are drawn and shaping an ideology to rationalize this reality, he seeks to give to thinkers and political leaders of Africa and the Diaspora a powerful, and in certain circumstances, decisive advantage, in the ideological contest with Europe.
For radical and revolutionary thinkers emerging from the national liberation movements in Africa, the Caribbean and the US, while Marxism provided a powerful intellectual apparatus in understanding Western societies, it failed in explaining the historically strategic questions surrounding the relationships of Europe and modern capitalism to peoples of color. Political questions, however, were even more difficult. How to assert, what would be considered “revisionist” and “nationalist” positions, while, at the same time, attempting to maintain alliances with revolutionary Marxist forces in nations like the USSR, the GDR and Cuba. What would be the ways of combining national cultures and traditions within the Marxist movement created other troubling issues. How to, in other words, be both an ally of the Marxist movements, but at the same time assert one’s ideological independence and even differences with them.
By the middle 1980′s, in the light of the crisis and eventual collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Munford began to rethink his previous positions.3 This along with the psychological impact of the findings of Black Ordeal compelled him to question what he would later determine were civilizational foundations of white behavior that go deeper than capitalism and in fact precede it. In Black Ordeal he discovered what he defined as sado-racism that he was only able to explain in civilizational terms. The impact of this pro-active form of racism (that exceeds in both intensity and content, white prejudice) has long term and almost permanent civilizational impact upon whites of all classes. In this respect, they view the world, and Africans in particular, through the prism of, not just race, but the historically and socially specific racism Munford calls sado-racism. A form of racism constructed in the bowels of the slave ships and on the killing fields of plantation slavery. “Today no class of the white population of the United States and Canada is objectively revolutionary (469),” he will eventually assert in Race and Reparations. This is so due to the “overdetermining” impact of white racist civilization and its culture upon white workers. In other words, Munford asserts that civilization trumps class and class struggle. As such, in the crunch, white revolutionaries and white workers will unite with white capitalists on the basis of race rather than with non-white workers on the basis of class. And he warns, “Those who would overlook the racial barrier in favor of a class analysis, underestimate the depths of racism in the North American scene…Over and over again racism has choked Black-white mass solidarity before it has broken ground (471).”
It is the complexities of theory, ideology and politics that Munford has traversed in arriving at his current explanatory framework and its inevitable political conclusions. If Race and Reparation separates Munford from traditional European Marxisms4, it also distances him from Black social democrats and liberals like Manning Marable, Cornel West, Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates. And although Munford makes extraordinary efforts to tailor his project to fit within Afrocentrism and almost every articulation of post 1960′s Pan Africansim, I will argue that he has little in common with these trend either. Munford’s enterprise is a late twentieth century synthesis of revolutionary Marxism and Black Nationalism. His investment in Marxist historical materialism is as significant as his commitment to the centrality of Africa and Black folk to the history of capitalism. Both philosophical and political stances shape his understanding of history and social transformation. He rejects totally the liberal notions of history and progress that hold that Black liberation must be a trickle down from European social development and be defined in Eurocentric terms. For liberalism (and most Marxisms), whites lead Blacks, be they the white bourgeoisie or working class. Munford denies that European civilization and the European proletariat can lead humanity to the next stage of civilizational and social development. He passionately repudiates the idea that humanity will follow or be recipients of a trickle down from European science, technology and culture. In the end, he rejects completely the European model and most of European civilization.5 His nationalism is rooted in the radical nationalism of Martin Delaney, Henry Highland Garnet, Ida B. Wells-Barnett and W.E.B Du Bois. What Munford sets out to construct is a macro-historical and macro-sociological theory of African history. He uses a revised Marxist conceptual and language grid, linked to Pan-African nationalist political philosophy and practices. He provides enormous data to substantiate both his theory and the political and policy proposals he presents. Munford, ultimately, deploys theory and philosophy to guide ideology and politics.
The empirical foundations and the theoretical framework for the current work are found in Munford’s three volume The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625-1715 (1991). Munford (1991: vol.1.iii) asserts: “All the peoples of the New World’s Black Diaspora are variations on a single theme. All were sacrificed on the same alter of suffering, lived lives of endless travail, and for generations after generation saw their children’s lives soured to enable white people to take over the western hemisphere, settle in, grow rich and flourish-all were hostage to the birth of capitalism. The birth pangs of the birth of capitalism in the Americas were not merely contemporaneous with Black slavery, in the world historic sense they were synonymous.” The dialectic between what Munford refers to as ” the slave mode of extracting surplus labor from captive Africans, on the one side, and the profit exigencies of a nascent, seaborne capitalism, on the other”, gave to the capitalist mode of production in the Western Hemisphere an “indelible racist coloration”. By the time of volume III Munford would implicitly connect the capitalist mode of production to what he in Race and Reparations refers to as white civilization. “Under capitalism”, he tells us (1991:Vol III, 831), “labor is subject to the discipline of hunger through dismissal. At least this has been so most of the time in economically advanced social formations. But from the sixteenth deep into the nineteenth century pre-industrial capitalist slaveholding imposed labor discipline by the whip, pyre, rope and the rapist’s penis. The psychotic, slavering, white beast that swung the lash, fired the stake and wielded the castrator’s knife was no social aberration. He was rather the authentic offspring of an organic socioeconomic hybrid, and he lorded it over the plantation. The monster was parented socially by the marriage of manufactory capitalism with Western Hemisphere Black slavery.” As a result of this a distinct class arrangement would emerge in the Western Hemisphere, of two antagonistic classes, the slaves and slave owners (1982:115). Munford contends in Race and Reparations that, in fact, this basic class arrangement would take on an international character as capitalism moved from mercantile to industrial capitalism: white capitalists on one side and enslaved, colonized and semi-colonized labor on the other. This arrangement leads to a North South division of the world, which is a metaphor of a global division based upon the color line. Race, not class, Munford asserts, becomes the principle contradiction on a world scale. White workers and middle classes in this global arrangement become an intermediary class, whose principle allegiances are not to class but to race.
Though not articulated by Munford, his explanatory system can be defined as a race/class/civilization paradigm, where civilization and race are prior to, and determine class struggle and economics. Put another way, civilizational categories and analyses supercedes economic categories and analyses and civilization contradictions and conflicts go beyond the class struggle as traditionally posed in European Marxism. Here is how Munford articulates matters:
Not many analyst have wanted to deal with the notion that racism can be embedded at the civilization level. There has been the tendency, therefore, to regard white racism merely as a kind of supplement, a corollary and addendum, at best a consolidation and replenishment factor. Racism has been viewed as a means to ‘divide the working class along color lines.’ Never was it seen as the kernel or germ cell of capitalism. White thinkers shied away from asking the ominous question-is racism a fundamental political-economy category of the white dominated capitalist mode of production? There was an unwillingness to look for a racist context in white social development. That would have meant distinguishing what is objectively necessary in white racist civilization from that which is merely possible. Of course, we are not talking about any rigid determinism like that based on belief in divine predestination, and which leads to fatalism. Meant instead is recognition that every cause has it effect, that the racism inherent in white civilization must effect all social phenomena. Racism needs to be scrutinized as something more than merely a specification of Black slavery, as more than a mode of slavery’s existence. It is not enough to view it merely as a means of perpetuating and consolidating and intensifying the exploitation of slave labor and after emancipation, merely as a tool to set Black and white wage-earners at each others’ throats. Racism has served those purposes, yet it is much more. The status of racist ideology as a rationalization and implementers of slave and segregation practices, need not blind us to the pre-of racial prejudices in the minds of the very first white slavers to appear on the African cost in the fifteenth century (8).
Here is where Munford makes the break with orthodox European political economy. First, race, he insists, must be viewed as a material relation of production. Second, the civilizational preconditions of race preceded capitalism. Third, there is “a racist context in white social development”. While the empirical referents for these assertions are Black Ordeal, Munford goes beyond the empirical to the explanatory level. To do this he challenges traditional western assumptions and explanatory designs concerning social reality. These he will contend are Eurocentric with few, if any, references to slavery and its decisive role in the emergence of capitalism and modern European societies. European social theory, he argues, has operated at two levels: the socio-economic base and the political/ideological superstructure. There is, he asserts a third level, “that is senior to both the superstructure and the socio-economic foundations (10).” This is the civilization level, which “projects a priori causation (ibid)”. Civilization he says, “set limits for social behavior, it draws configurations, it creates the ‘paradigm’ (ibid).” This is what is called civilization-level causation.6 civilizational determinations, Munford insists, are ultimate or primary determinations, which shape and override socio-economic and superstructural level determinations. Munford proposes, in this regard, a strategic inversion of European social theory; rather than class determining race relations, race determines class. While social class, politics and ideology are either socio-economic or superstructural categories; race is a civilizational category. Race, therefore, both determines and contextualizes class relationships. Race, moreover, has historical and explanatory primacy (as a civilizational causation) over class. Hence, for Munford, the entire array of class, social and ideological relationships and behaviors are ultimately determined by civilizational causative factors, chief among them race. Viewing reality through the lens of civilization and race, he suggests, allows for a deeper and wider explanatory framework. Moreover, as a consequence of this procedure, Africans and African Americans are introduced into historical explanation as strategic agents of social transformation and their own liberation; as well as being central to the emergence of modern capitalism and its elimination. Civilization, he argues, is a more comprehensive and intelligible unit for understanding human behavior. “We preferred the history of civilization, not class struggle, as the stage for conflict and interaction among people. Instead of feudal lords versus serfs, or the bourgeoisie versus the proletariat, we made the major historical component something African, European, Pre-Columbian American, Chinese, Indian subcontinental, and such like (50).” This he insists allows him to concentrate more fruitfully on the total package.
“As a general rule,” Munford (11) argues, “disharmony between civilizational-level values on the one hand, and socio-economic and superstructural tendencies on the other, is temporary, apparent rather than real, and socially disruptive.” The primacy of civilization explains “the consequences of the Africanness of the men and women who survived the Middle Passage and the ‘seasoning’ (12).” On the other side Western civilization is inherently racist. Put another way Western Civilization is white civilization, defined by the “generality of racism in Western civilization (15).” He makes the following exceptions to the general rule, “But no civilization is a featureless monolith without countervailing influences, and the very principle of bedrock determination allows for non-characteristic trends and influences which do not fit with the basic features of the civilization (14).” Therefore, certain whites may for religious reasons, and a calculated sense of self-interest, reject racism. These good whites have never been decisive. “From the ideological perspective, the essence of white culture was fixed by the attitudes of the ruling elite and those ruling ideas were racist (15).” All of this said, Munford pays homage to white civilization’s enlightened contributors like Beethoven, Mozart, Da Vinci and Picasso, Newton and Einstein. Third world thinkers and activist, he points out have found inspiration in Marx and Lenin. Neither does he reject the achievements of Western medicine and immunology; nor the leaps into the cosmos through space travel. These, unfortunately, are nullified by “a counter-tradition that has always been the stronger, because it is more in tune with the true values of white civilization (23).” In the end, “Five centuries of white supremacy have given world history a racist character. The once vaunted class contradictions have been subsumed under the racial contradiction, swallowed up in race conflict. While the question of power within most African states may well have to be sorted out on the basis of class struggle, we are concerned here with the fundamental international racial-color contradiction between white supremacy and Black empowerment. The fight against white racism-not class struggle-now functions as the driving force of the development of society. Third World peoples are the only remaining global revolutionary force (25).” Contemporary racism, in the end, has become white world supremacy. Racism, he argues, is securely planted among white masses. And rejecting the Marxist notion that once the economic foundations that are served by racism are eliminated the function of racism will be eliminated, he says, “The popularity of white racism is such that it would be certain to live on in some form, even long after the economic soil which nourishes it were destroyed (33).” Moreover, “the racist predisposition would survive among ordinary whites in the guise of perverted sexual lusts, sick fantasies, aversions to ‘Negroid’ racial features, and genocidal urges. It is too firmly seated in white cultural patterns and languages to enable European civilization-conditioned Caucasians to encounter large numbers of African-derived people without hostility and contempt (ibid).”
This civilizational procedure leads Munford to explain the history and political economy of capitalism as an inevitable outcome of white civilization. It leads him to the conclusion that capitalism is parasitic upon Africans and other peoples of color; producing a welfare system for whites. Moreover, slavery and colonialism created the material conditions for white abundance and leisure. The civilization procedure and the subordination of the class struggle to race and civilization is confirmed, Munford argues, by events after 1989 in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The richer West was bound to win the Cold War, he asserts. This because East and West shared common civiliztional foundations, both “belong to white civilization-from which overriding impulses flow, urges that are racist in nature (153).” It was, he tells us, only a matter of time before the populist racist sentiments kicked in compelling the Russian and Eastern European masses to demand a return within the white supremacy system headed by the West. “Before his death, the great revolutionary Lenin himself,” Munford contends, ” came to realize that the image of the ‘noble and unprejudiced white proletarian’ was a hollow myth. Much of the pathos of his final years sprang from his attempt to contend politically with white workers whose racial instincts were as base as any white capitalist’s (153).” What sank the Russian Revolution after less than seventy-five years was its lack of “the proper civilization base to work with (155).” Munford further argues that the window of opportunity provided for the West European proletariat by the Russian Revolution was allowed to pass as Communist Parties failed to seize the revolutionary moment. These parties, like the trade unions, eventually became consumed by opportunism and careerism. The general tendency to reaction in the white world has two causes, he tells us: the first is civilizational and the second is based in a general rule of politics. There is a political precept that sets a time limit in which revolutionary parties must achieve power. That window of opportunity is 20 to 30 years, after which they shed their revolutionary integrity for opportunism and careerism. These two factors, Munford argues, predisposes the West to reaction that, at the end of the twentieth century, overrides class struggle and class-consciousness. Hence, the possibility of European revolutionary change on the order of the October Revolution, which will bring about a strategic break with white supremacy, is no longer an historical probability. This being the case, the motive forces of world historic change are in the non-white world and are in an inevitable conflict with the white world. This arises from the failure of the Russian Revolution to pass on its initial spirit and aims to succeeding generations, or to spread to the West. As a consequence, the center of world history is outside white civilization. In fact, Munford argues, when confronted by the revolutionary transformative urges of the non-white world, whites of all class unite to defend white world supremacy. He concludes, the winds of change that took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1992 were a racist counterrevolution and that “the only lesson of value left to learn from the version of socialism that held sway in eastern Europe and the USSR is that reaction and racism are immensely popular among white masses everywhere. The fall of European Communism showed the egoism of white workers. It indicated stubborn refusal to espouse racial equality and friendship with non-whites (162).” These events in the East were only demonstrative of what had been observed in the West, that white workers have a material interest, not in class solidarity with non-whites, but in solidarity with white capitalist in a unified civilization front. Munford cites a long history of white solidarity in US history, including Jacksonian Democracy, the Fugitive Slave Act, the Homestead Act, the defeat of Reconstruction, Jim Crow and the more recent betrayals in the move of working class whites to the political right. Munford insists, “Poor whites fronted for the new bosses in the post-Bellum South and were the mainstay of Jim Crow until its partial dismantling during the 1960s. Today the role of the old Southern poor whites has been taken over, in large part, by a racial hierarchy of occupation based on ethnicity (179).” However, the political economic underpinning of ethnicity is race hierarchy in jobs, where Blacks and other peoples of color are consigned to the hardest, most dangerous, least skilled and lowest paid jobs.
Munford will go on to describe what can only be termed a racist terrorist dictatorship over African Americans whose labor is increasingly redundant under conditions of the scientific and technological revolution and the globalization of capitalist relationships of production. High unemployment and the lumpenization and criminalization of Black males are the new form that white supremacy has taken in the US. As long as Black people in their majority were in the South sharecropping, tenant farming, performing convict-lease labor and under debt peonage and neoslavery, “the incidence of unemployment in Black America remained less sensitive to the business cycle (81).” During the depths of the Great Depression a few northern Blacks ‘escaped joblessness’ because racist social custom dictated that shining shoes, for instance, was so lowly an occupation it had to be restricted to Blacks. The racist differential in unemployment and the permanent state of Depression for Blacks kicked in when the majority of Blacks were in the North and a part of the industrial work force. As many authors have shown the Jim Crow system was transferred to Northern urban ghettos. In fact modern Jim Crow is urban ghettoization, combined with low and semi-skilled industrial and service sector jobs, high unemployment and astronomical poverty.7 Both white capitalists and white unions, Munford points out, enforce this arrangement. “We were banned from unions (84),” he tells us. “Despite lip-service to Black-white worker solidarity, AFL and CIO both permitted their locals to keep lily-white clauses.” This system Munford argues was profitable to both white labor and capital. “The profit boom which extended from 1948 to 1968″ he points out, “was caused by the wage differentials to the disadvantage of Black workers (84).” However as the profit boom came to a close and through the decades of the ’70′s. 80′s and 90′s Black industrial labor declined to disastrous levels. Black workers, traditionally consigned to the most difficult, hottest and dirtiest jobs were now being eliminated altogether. A new racist division of labor was cemented, where “businessmen argued that the growing high tech component of production made it possible for the first time in U.S. history to do without Black unskilled and semi-skilled labor, i.e. since a lot it was no longer needed as a source of profit, Black labor was ‘de-valorized’ (86).” Millions of Black males have been cast upon history’s scrap heap and thrown into jails. The stark reality, Munford states is that “Inner-city youths, most black and Latino males, have been doomed to exclusion from the productive process by the very evolution of the American economy in the last decade of the twentieth century.” Moreover, “the organic process of restructuring US domestic production often termed ‘deindustrialization,’ has marginalized the huge third of black America called the ‘underclass.’ Thus after the creation of big city concentrations of Black industrial workers from Southern rural raw material in the first half of the twentieth century, the process reversed in the second half of the century (92).”
“The peculiar history of capital accumulation sealed our fate in many ways (91),” Munford argues. This “in the land in which-sometime between 1890 and 1919-capital found it wise to spare white workers from the extortion of excess profits, instead targeting Black and other workers of color as the source of enormous super-profits. America is the country in which the white middle and working classes joined hands with the lords of capital in exploiting and repressing the Black community-repression manifested of late in the ‘prisonization’ of the black male (91).” Munford continues, “Should white capital find it can no longer profit from Black male labor, it may challenge these men’s right to exist as human beings. The ultra-Right already growls that ‘America should rid itself of non-white drones who handicap it in competition with Germany and Japan’ (92).” And as the year 2050 approaches when demographers predict a non-white majority in the US Munford proposes what might be the white Right’s answer: “White supremacy must then either cede power to the New Majority of Blacks and other people of color, or scrap our current white serving majoritarian democracy as obsolete, in favor of white minority rule along the model of, say, South African apartheid. The latter option would require outright fascist dictatorship, quarantine of non-white communities and wholesale slaughter of Black resisters (92).” Already, the author points out, Blacks live in a virtual police state. Incarceration, he says, is the house that economic restructuring built (328). The criminalization of Black males also involves the “Willy Hortonization” of Black leaders, targeting them for harassment and imprisonment (351). The criminalization of Blacks has the support of most whites. Two of every three whites believe “cops are tops”, expressing full confidence in them and admiring the way they hold back the tide of Black and Afro-Latino lawbreakers. “Nearly half of the white population (46%) had been fully convinced that big city police treat Blacks as fairly and as courteously as they treat whites, Almost three-quarters love the ‘fairness’ of white judges and believe the courts to be absolutely impartial in racial matters (354).” And the future looks even more ominous, “Whites aged 18 to 30 during the 1990s were more anti-Black than their ‘Baby Boomer’ parents, aged 30 to 49 (354).” This, and the situation of Africa, where the “continent lies prostrate, her people starving, sick with diseases designed in foreign laboratories, weltering in bloody retribalism (372),” defies the European derived concept of class analysis and class struggle. This failure demands that Blacks look elsewhere; primarily to their own history and resources. Therefore, a “Black-led coalition of people of color are tactics aimed at fragmenting the white mainstream along its natural fault lines (456).” He calls for a “complexion criterion” when choosing allies; that is dark skinned Latinos and Native Americans first.
Munford, in this light, proposes a twenty-first century nationalist/Pan-Africanist/Afrocentrist political stance. His twenty-first century Pan Africanism is rooted in a strategic vision of the next century and an Afrocentric concept of realpolitik. Decisive to the success of Pan-Africanism is the achievement of African military parity with the world’s Great Powers. “The moment has come for a remodeled Pan-Africanism, tailored to the twenty-first century. Required now is a revolutionary new Black supra-nationalism, tall enough to look beyond tribal friction, island snobbishness, and Diaspora myopia (408).” Potential allies are China and India. “The Chinese example shows how a large, relatively weak, once brutally semi-colonized Third World country can muster the economic and military power to assert real independence (409).” “Pan-Africanism is Black internationalism, now and for the future (410),” Munford insists. “Equality for Black folk worldwide can come only through the emergence of some Black nations as Great Powers,” he (399) contends. At the end of the day, “the coming century may see the price of white supremacy soar to international racial warfare (404).” Furthermore, “the contradiction between the North and South is the main contradiction in today’s world. Elimination of white ‘Northern’ supremacy must top twenty-first century Pan-Africanism’s docket, and head the historical agenda of the whole world.” Continental and Diasporan Africans, he demands, must in the next century focus upon the achievement of real economic, political and military power on a world scale. None of these, he says, will be attained painlessly. “In fact, there is the sobering possibility of a series of wars extending over several generations. Comparable historical changes have seldom occurred without strife and conquest (405).” History is cruel, he let’s us know. Pan-Africanist must break free of any allusions about white folk. “White folk around the globe have repudiated socialism. In Russia they threw the Soviet baby out with the bath water of communism. Yet socialism was the only potentially non-racist political economy white civilization ever produced. These events strengthen Pan-African suspicion of white men bearing ideological ‘gifts’…Most white-derived ideas about political economy are poisonous to Black folk…(409).”
Munford’s Pan African vision includes as a basic part reparations, for both Blacks on the continent and in the Diaspora. However, the achievement of power and reparation in the US is founded on Munford’s personal belief that “an epochal recasting of American social life extending over decades (433),” will occur. It is into this situation that he conceives the demands for reparation taking on greater force. He construes reparations as “encompassing affirmative action, employment equity, race-conscious quotas, parity, minority set-asides, equality of results, free, state of the art health care and above all legislated and government-administered remittances of assets and monies. A reparations program might also include a family income plan (FIP) [430].”
Clarence J. Munford’s book takes the reader quite a distance, from philosophy and theory of history to real politics and reparations. Indeed, Munford seeks to develop theory to serve practice and collective struggle. What he, therefore presents the reader with is a philosophico-theoretical-ideological package. Although it is a unified whole, each of its components can be looked at and evaluated separately for its strengths and weaknesses. Munford has constructed a rational explanatory system rooted in the history, current conditions, and possibilities of revolutionary change in the African world. In this sense his project is Pan-Africanist . It also is a synthesis that draws on Marxism and Pan Africanism. However, the reviewer cannot overlook the contradictions inherent to any synthesis.
The civilization procedure seeks deeper level explanation; and by so doing asserts a distinct Afrocentric theory of history and historical events. Munford’s procedure is in several ways similar to French structuralism.8 European anthropologists seeking to understand the deeper meanings inherent to non-white cultures first deployed structuralism as a way to define deeply held, almost permanent values and beliefs of peoples. French Marxism a generation ago embraced a form of what came to be called Marxist structuralism. Louis Althusser (1970) was the central figure in this movement. The entire language that Munford uses of levels of determinations and over and under determination is clearly related to structuralism. Munford present levels of determination hierarchically and historically. In other words, the socio-economic base and deeply held civilizational values and beliefs overdetermine the political ideological superstructure of society. Hence civilization overdetermines economics and predisposes both collective and individual behavior at the social and ideological levels in predetermined and predictable directions. At the same time, the socio-economic and political ideological superstructures of society underdetermine civilization. While Munford does acknowledge that there can be contradictions in and between various levels, short of a profound revolutionary rupture, static, predetermined and predictable relationships and patterns of interaction are in place. At the same time he views these levels as existing within historical contexts, or historical epochs. Within this also is a concept of crises. For instance, Munford points to either actual or possible crises in the world system and in particular nations.
And while Munford speaks of political, economic and other social crises and even the possibilities of crises between civilizational level events and economic events, there is not once a mention or discussion of civilizational crises. Epochal events of the twentieth century like World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, World War II, the Chinese Revolution, the Afro-Asiatic national liberation movements have created a deep civilizational crisis in the West. Cultural pessimism and existentialism, the search for meaning in life and the emergence of a sense of the absurdity of life are manifestations of this civilizational crisis. Some would argue that it is far deeper than the economic and political crises and have longer-term significance then they.9 Moreover, many critics of pop culture in the West view it as a response to the crisis of civilization on the one side and an attempt by media and cultural manipulators to use pop culture to disguise a deeper sense of meaninglessness of the masses of whites. This level of crisis would have deep meaning in the context of profound economic or political crises.
Operating from within his paradigm it would be useful for Munford to articulate the civilizational dimensions of the North South contradiction as distinct from what are immediate economic and political conflicts. For instance, language, cultural appropriation of non-Western values and the ideological dimensions of civilization should be explored. The clash of civilizations (see Huntington, 1996 and Fukuyama, 1992),10 must be elaborated in concrete historical terms. It is also important to acknowledge that even proponents of white supremacy acknowledge civilization contradictions and conflicts. Fukuyama (1992) understood the Cold War with the Soviet Union in essentially civilizational terms. For him the end of the Cold War can be understood as the end of history and the end of the civilizational challenge to the West. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War, Huntington (1996) suggests, has intensified what he defines as the clash of civilizations. The opposite of the view held by Fukuyama. Munford, in contrast to these thinkers, makes a strong case when arguing that at the heart of the conflict of civilizations is the matter of color and white supremacy. Hence, the civilizational crisis has not been resolved, as suggested by Fukuyama, nor does it occur in a colorblind multipolar world as suggested by Huntington. Race for Munford, is the central dynamic of European civilization and white supremacy defines its global system. Inevitably the conflict of civilizations is the conflict over race.
The civilization procedure, with all of its philosophical and explanatory strengths, has a tendency to give inordinate weight to the ultimate civiliztional causations of events, without paying close enough attention to actual events and contradictions themselves. Day to day events are viewed primarily as manifestations of deeper civilization events. In such an approach, the question remains how does one deal with immediate economic and political issues? Munford’s paradigm is convincing as an explanation of the general movement of history and the level at which the contradictions of history are most profound. It faces problems in dealing with the conflict of classes. It is plausible to contend that civilizational events overdetermine economic and political events, but this is not the same as arguing that they are in the process negated. Somehow the conflict and contradictions of class must find a more dynamic place in Munford’s paradigm. No matter how timid and inconsistent the white proletariat and middle classes are in opposing white capitalists and in expressing unity with non-white workers, it would appear that the objective division between white capitalist and white workers continues to assert itself and to be of strategic and tactical benefit to Black liberation. Perhaps Munford is correct in asserting that the class conflict must not define the nature of the Black world struggle, however, it must be factored into any consideration of global realities. No matter how one cuts it, it would seem that if not the motor force of history, the class struggle is a motor force in contemporary history. And, therefore, economic contradictions will continue to assert themselves at every level of social reality.
Which leads to another issue: is the fault line between North and South most sharply drawn at the level of civilization or at the level of economics and politics or all of the above simultaneously? And if so, how? Flowing from this set of questions Munford must clarify whether he believes that a civilizationally appropriate form of capitalist development should occur in Africa. Which then raises the question of the forms and content of the class struggle in Africa. Will capitalism in Africa not align itself with capitalism in Europe and Asia to the detriment of the African masses? Presently in Africa, the main form of the internal class conflict focuses at the ideological and political levels. It is, as Munford suggests, determined in large measure by the North South conflict. However, it has its own internal dynamics as the recent struggles in the former Zaire indicate.
At the same time the struggle of the African American people is unavoidably linked to the wide front of struggles and contradictions in the US political economy. It is worth noting, as Brenda Gayle Plummer (1996) insists, that African Americans have tended to view the world through the lens of their domestic struggles. This does not deny internationalism, but conditions it. Which raises the issue of how, in practical terms, to confront what Du Bois observed is double consciousness among African Americans. Double consciousness suggests multiple identities and, from an objective standpoint, mutually interacting connections and relationships within the US economy, polity and culture. Thus, how is the internationalism or Pan-Africanism of African Americans expressed given their intertwining, albeit at the lowest and most oppressed levels, within the US working class? African American workers share many similar struggles with white workers, a reality they daily confront. Blacks tend, moreover, to often be the most militant elements of strikes and trade union struggles. Black workers, for instance, are acutely conscious of their interest in maintaining some form of democracy in the US and preventing fascism from emerging. It would appear necessary, therefore, to understand Pan-African consciousness as being framed by these essential realities of class and race in the US context. These are issues having to do with the modes and forms of transitional struggle and the nature of both objective and subjective alliances.
Finally, there is the issue of socio-economic formations, or modes of production. Will the outcome of the long North South struggle lead to a world divided by two distinct modes of production, one North and capitalist and one South and, maybe, socialist? Beyond parity in matters economic, political and military, what else defines this conflict? What mode of production, or socio-economic formation will arise from the prolonged North South struggle? Take for example the Black majorities in South Africa and Brazil: should not Munford propose something in terms of the next stage of struggle and the socio-economic formation which should come forth? Does Munford propose something completely new and completely different from socialism? And if so, what?
Questions having to do with modes of production and socio-economic formations raise critical ideological issues within Pan-Africanism and the African world. Should a theory of social transformation undifferentiatedly treat all nationalisms as progressive? Are post 1960′s cultural nationalisms equally as progressive as revolutionary nationalism? Should Senghor’s negritude and Mobutu’s authenticity be placed alongside the progressive nationalism of Nkrumah, Cabral and Sekou Toure? And if so how and upon what principles? Or take, for example, Garveyism, which is conservative nationalism and Pan-Africanism; how should it be viewed? Not only did Garvey find it convenient to meet with the KKK, but believed that British imperialism was best able to rule Africa. His conservative Anglophone nationalism would be at odds with progressive modern day Afrocentrism and what Munford defines as revolutionary Pan-Africanism. 11 And within the inevitable contest of ideas among Pan-Africanists how should the intellectual and ideological heritage of W.E.B Du Bois be treated?
However, beyond nationalism, one cannot underestimate the protest tradition of the Black movement that extends back to Paul Cuffy and Richard Allen, through David Walker, Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, W.E.B Du Bois and Martin Luther King, among others. Nor can it be overlooked that a significant dimension of all progressive Black nationalisms has been the protest element. The cultural nationalist element in the African American context, on the other hand, has tended to askew protest in the interest of culture and institution building. The protest dimension of our struggle, however, remains a durable resource both in the Civil Rights and nationalist traditions and would seem to have continuing value. Munford seems to overlook it as passé.
All of this said, Munford has written an important work. His ideas for the twenty-first century are still in formation. Their strengths are in the bold way they confront the realities of race and civilization. Their critique of European social theory, along with the innovative way they define the historic agency of Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora, lays the foundation for a new theoretical understanding of Black liberation. The weakness of Munford’s project at this stage is rooted in an all or nothing sense of the confrontations between North and South. In realistic terms Africans or Africans in the Diaspora will struggle for the ultimate civilizational issues to the extent they are connected to immediate day-to-day issues. They will form alliances rooted in those struggles. In the course of this, perhaps, the deeper civilizational causations of events will become known. This being said there is no doubt the questions Munford presents will become part of the discourse on the future of Black folk.

NOTES

1 It should be noted that in modern European thought Marxism is but one of the radical traditions that claim to be advancing the Enlightenment. There is a radical or left libertarian trend as well. Noam Chomsky is the best know exemplar of this position (see Barsky, 1997:chapter 3). Chomsky (1987:152) advances 17th and 18th century rationalism and liberalism, where the principle of individual freedom is primary. He says, “the principles of people like von Humboldt and Adam Smith and others were that people should be free.” And, again he says he looks forward to “a day when these various strands [of 17th and 18th century rationalism and liberalism] will be brought together within the framework of libertarian socialism , a social form that barely exists today though its elements can be perceived: in the guarantee of individual rights that has achieved it highest form-though still tragically flawed-in the Western democracies; the Israeli kibbutzim; in the experiments with workers councils in Yugoslavia; in the effort to awaken popular consciousness and create a new involvement in the social process which is a fundamental element in the Third World revolutions, coexisting uneasily with indefensible authoritarian practices.”
2 Donald Sassoon (1997:5) argues that popular or ‘vulgar Marxism’ was an interpretation that was designed to strongly appeal to trade union leaders of the working class movement. Marxism in its popular rendering was adapted to the needs of the European working class and explained its organization into larger units of production. Sassoon (ibid:8) suggests Class consciousness was constructed by political activists, just as nationalism was constructed by nationalists, feminism by feminist and racism by racist.”
3 In the article “Marxism and the History of Africa: Reading Walter Rodney”(1982) Munford critiques Rodney’s conceptualization of African history from the standpoint of orthodox Marxism. Munford argues, “As profound a thinker and as anti-imperialist as he was, Walter Rodney nonetheless made theoretical mistakes. Although he considered himself to be within the broad framework of the Marxist tradition, his conclusions were not always consistent with the science of historical materialism. In fact, some were anti-historical materialist (1982:124).” He would also say, “In principal Rodney agreed that social class has been the decisive element in the history of the world. But as a practicing historian, he vacillated as to whether class is the essential feature of African history (ibid:125).” Munford, as we will see, in Race and Reparations will also deny that class is “the essential feature of African history”.
4 I here use the concept Marxisms to denote the many trends within contemporary Marxism. For a discussion of the diversity of trends see Martin Jay (1984). The Western Marxist concept of totality and universality emerged from a fiercely Eurocentrist and Enlightenment paradigm.
5 See endnote 1 for an example of how this extreme Eurocentrism is articulated by a leading left liberal , or radical libertarian. Europe and European civilization, in this view, are in the vanguard of humanity. European values are the model for humanity and will in the end save humanity. Noam Chomsky’s radical libertarianism and Francis Fukuyama’s centrist liberalism carry similar, if not identical, ideas about the centrality and supremacy of European values and European history.
6 It is necessary to get beyond what is here an essentially functionalist conception of civilization. That is to argue from the standpoint of what civilization does, or how it functions. There must at some point be an explanation of the basic elements or mechanisms of civilization. Here I would suggest that language is the central and most basic mechanism of civilization. Language is more than and more profound then a mere system of communication; it is an indispensable internal civilizational dynamic, necessary to expressing and unleashing the spiritual and creative energies of civilizations. European civilization in its linguistic practices and structures reveal its profound racist essence. For instance, evil is black, virtue is white. Linguists have discovered many more examples.
7 Professor Robert Rhodes of the University of Ohio defines this as a new lumpentry system. A system, which includes the large populations of essentially racially oppressed peoples who live in deep poverty and long term or permanent unemployment. One third of Black people are considered part of this population. Some estimates are that 2 billion people on a global scale comprise this general lumpentry system. I prefer the notion general lumpentry system because it more accurately describes those populations that extend beyond the traditional lumpenproletariat or déclassé .It is also more than an aggregate of individuals thrown out of economic production and forced to beg, and live a life of crime. These are now the marginalized and ruined poor plus the lumpen. I reject the concept underclass because it carries with it the baggage of culture of poverty and blame the victim theories, when in fact what is described is actually a new social and class category emerging from the globalization of capitalism and the new technology. Jacqueline Jones has aptly referred to these as stranded populations.
8 French structuralism in its sociologistic and Marxian versions (as against its mentalist and anthropological versions) seeks to discover organizing principles of social life. Principles are viewed as the deep underlying and determining facts of social totalities. What Munford implies is a hierarchy of determinations starting with civilization as a set of deeply held, hard to change values and dispositions. These are what Althusser (1970) would term “structuring structures”. What Munford does, which is not present in Althusser, is to include deep structures as a component of historical transformation. Historicity is important for Munford’s paradigm because of the sense of crisis, revolutionary rupture and discontinuity and break within structures and systems and their transition to a new level of the whole, which he ultimately wishes to (indeed, has to) explain. Thus, while never explicitly stated, Munford’s procedure involves the diachronic sense of structures/levels, that is, viewing them in historical time; and equally a synchronic sense of structures, that is, viewing structures/levels like the civilizational, socio-economic and political/ideological interacting upon one another at the same time in time. However, it remains to be seen whether Munford’s paradigm can acknowledge multiple determinations interacting in non-hierarchical relations. While this is clearly not the time or place to expound upon methodological issues, it is worth noting that non-hierarchical relations are possible and, I would argue, can explain the complexities of revolutionary transition which Munford discusses. In particular I find Kontopoulos’s (1993:55) discussion of heterarchies helpful. Rather than single determinations ordered hierarchically (in Munford’s case from the bottom, or foundation, upward), we can speak of multiple or interacting determinations. Hence, as Kontopoulos puts it, “heterarchies involve multiple access, multiple linkages and multiple determinations.” This conceptualization of determinations, and what is dialectical complexity, will work better with Munford’s implicit sense of crisis and revolutionary rupture. Thus, a profound revolutionary crisis of the type Munford suggests is necessary to undermine the global white supremacist system, will involve a situation where, conceivably, civilizational events and levels conflict with political and ideological events; where economic events and civilizational events conflict. Here the moment is determined heterarchically, rather than hierarchically. Rather than single determinations, there are multiple determinations, where the movement of the system is determined not from a state of equilibrium, or balanced , but far from equilibrium; what has been referred to as chaotic dynamics.
9 Existentialism and now neo-pragmatism, a la Richard Rorty and Cornel West, are efforts to come to terms with this civilizational crisis. West, for instance, talks constantly of confronting the absurd and expresses a profound pessimism concerning black culture’s ability to overcome or work out of the crisis of civilization of the West. He sees a growing nihilism among, especially, young Blacks. On the other hand Francis Fukuyama (1992) views the end of the Cold War as having resolved the crisis of values and thus the civilizational crisis of the West. History and civilization return to their normal paths of evolution, according to him.
10 Samuel P. Huntington coming from a white supremacist direction also conceptualizes civilization as the essential category of social life in the wake of the end of the Cold War. He states, “In the post-Cold War world for the first time in history global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational (1996:22) And, finally, “In this new world the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities (ibid:28).” It is apparent from the overall text that Huntington uses culture and civilization interchangeably. It is also clear that he would agree with Munford’s assessment that civilization trumps class struggle. What he does not do is to link these larger struggles to the struggle against white supremacy as a global system.
11 I have argued elsewhere that academic Afrocentrists have become more interested in tenure and scholarship within the framework of prestigious white universities. Its central aim has become multiculturalism, rather than radical social transformation. (see “A Short History of Propaganda”)

REFERENCES

Althusser, Louis. 1970. Reading ‘Capital’. London: New Left Books.

Barsky, Robert F. 1997. Noam Chomsky: A Life In Dissent. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Chomsky, Noam. 1987. The Chomsky Reader. New York: Pantheon Books.

Du Bois, W.E.B.. 1995 (1915). “The African Roots of the War” in W.E.B Du Bois : A Reader, David Levering Lewis (ed). New York: Henry Holt.

1992 (1925). “The Negro Mind Reaches Out”, in The New Negro, Alain Locke (ed). New York: Atheneum.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books.

Huntington, Samuel, P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Jay, Martin. 1984. Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas. Berkeley CA.: University of California Press.

Kontopoulos, Kyriakos. 1993. The Logics of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Monteiro, Anthony. June, 1997.”A Short History of Propaganda”. Real News. Philadelphia

Munford, Clarence, J. 1991. The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625-1715, Volumes I,II,III. Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press.

1982. “Marxism and the History of Africa: Reading Walter Rodney”. Revolutionary World: An International Journal of Philosophy. 49/50: 97-133.

Plummer, Brenda, Gayle. 1996. Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960. Chapel Hill/London: University of North Carolina Press.

Sassoon, Donald. 1996. One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century. New York: The New Press.

Posted in Black Intellectual, Political and Ideological Issues, BOOK REVIEWS, LOGIC , METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY | Leave a comment

Time, Space and Race: On Clarence J. Munford’s Race and Civilization

RACE AND CIVILIZATION: Rebirth of Black Centrality (2001) is Clarence J. Munford’s sequel to Race and Reparation: A Black Perspective for the 21st Century (1996). He says of this current project, “I strive to weave together the scattered strands of my own thought, hoping to illuminate margins and cervices readers say were left murky in Race and Reparations.” The work is encyclopedic in scope and is a profound inquiry into matters of race, white supremacy, capitalism and black liberation. It is contemporary in that it deals with the current moment of race, class and national liberatory conflict. Munford seeks to produce a general theory of global white supremacy and a scientific African and African American centered worldview. It is a deeply political work. Its author refuses to hide behind academic double speak and word magic. It is unapologetically radical in that it aims to lay foundations for the ideological struggle against white supremacy and imperialism.

Munford defines his philosophical outlook and methodology as “civilizational historicism,” which he says is “a system of thought, a philosophy, an explanatory model with a specific purpose-a worldview of use value to Black folk (2001:1).” Munford hopes, therefore, that what he has produced will be translated into practical programs and strategies. To the extent that this work engages epistemological and methodological issues it does so finally from the standpoint of praxis. A fascinating outcome is aimed for, a practical metaphysics and a metaphysics of practice.

I EXAMINE THIS WORK PHILOSOPHICALLY and from a social theoretic perspective. Ideas of time, being and space will inform my approach.1 Indeed, it is African Being and Time in the historical space of European hegemony and African/African American resistance that is the context of this inquiry. I chose this angle of investigation in order to explore within the confines of Munford’s book, and for general social-theoretic and philosophical purposes connected to the project of African and African American liberation, questions of temporality and spatiality: and contrast Munford’s and my perspective to notions of progress as asserted in European thought since the Enlightenment. I therefore attempt to transgress, problematize, and invert the comfort zone of time as assumed in European-centered historiography and social theory.2 I argue that Munford is among those Africana historians striving to construct a new historiography of the African world. To do so, I suggest, requires a new understanding of Time, Being and Space; one which recognizes the malleability not just of Space and Being, but also of Time.

There are, on the other hand, the social structural levels, below the macro-historical level which Munford’s work investigates, where historical epochs are concretized; for instance, in the lives of individuals, small collectivities, such as tribal groups, rural communities; macro and meso level structures, such as socio-economic classes, as well as social fragments, such as the lumpen-proletariat, stranded populations, such as maroon communities, migrant populations and homeless communities, and further, in institutions, such as the racialized state, the Black Church, Negro colleges, political, cultural, business and economic institutions. These structural levels and their structuring modalities carry specific temporalities. Such angles of investigation are worked out in, among others, the theorizing of Franz Fanon, Kyriakos M. Kontopoulos, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Hortense Spillers and Lewis Gordon. It is possible to discover moments of compatibility and common practical proposals for these distinct levels of these critics’ theorizing and Munford’s robust macro-historicism. Moreover, discrete structural levels adhere to distinct time modalities and rhythms. Time, however, is a complicated measure of socio-historical movement. It is further complicated because it, conceivably, varies between groups based upon their place in the social system of domination and their status as oppressed or oppressors.

PROBLEMS OF THE PLASTICITY OF TIME can fit Munford’s project of periodizing historical time in epochs (the long wave study of history), and the rhythms and velocity of historical transformations. However, there is yet another investigative region that concerns logic. We might refer to this as the logic (or perhaps logics) of time and space. Here we enter into the problems understood within the realm of dialectical logic. When engaging levels of socio-historical being we confront distinct logics inherent to the structural level being investigated. We can, therefore, speak of dialectics within dialectics. Understanding the epistemology of this project is part of our engagement with dialectical reasoning; compelling a complexification of the project. In many instances turning and inverting it, and subjecting it to angles of observation not necessarily inherent to it. This essay attempts to begin that work.

Science figures prominently in this project. Munford’s effort embraces three commitments. First to truth as discoverable, secondly, to a materialist and objectivist concept of reality and thirdly, to a rationalist form of explanation. On all three counts Munford’s is a conventional approach to science. Side by side with this investment in scientific inquiry and explanation is the assertion of what he calls the deep structural level of explanation or what is in affect the historical a priori. This is that range of beliefs, values and structures that precede the moment to be investigated. They are what could be called structured structuring structures.3 The historical a priori is, for Munford, race. Race is the overarching or central dialectic in modern world history. Race is generative, or to use Munford’s designation, overdetermining, of other events and structures. At the level of explanation, race shapes explanation, and perception. Race as an explanatory category sets rules for the explanation of events. Race is, then, a structuring logic.4

MUNFORD’S EXPLANATORY MODALITY is a complicated mix of history, philosophy and science. It is composed of a three-level engagement with objective reality. First, Munford is committed to history as critical to social inquiry. In other words Time and temporality are critical to understanding the dynamics of socio-historical processes. Secondly, Munford’s philosophy of modern history is founded upon the assumption that history proceeds dialectically and that race and the conflict with white supremacy are central to its understanding. Thirdly, history can be a science; meaning patterns, laws and regularities and cause and affect in history are discoverable.”

MUNFORD’S MUSCULAR and globalist approach to history challenges modern trends in social explanation that are ahistorical or only mildly historical. Epistemologies such as Cornel West’s (1989) prophetic pragmatism, the discursive relativism of Molefi Asante (1998) and Lucious Outlaw (1996), the black existentialism of Lewis Gordon (1995) or the psychoanalysis of Hortense Spillers (2003) fall among those epistemologies that permit discourses on oppression without suggesting logics and praxes to change it. By contrast, Munford seeks to link theory to ideology and social transformation. He eschews methodological individualism, in forms as varied as existentialism, rational choice theory and psychoanalysis, and asserts the centrality of historically constituted collectivities. In social theoretic terms, Munford engages historically constituted totalities as the object and subject of history and historical transformation.

Munford, finally, does not merely navigate the terrain of historical facts and events, but he is concerned with their organization, interpretation and critique. His epistemology is restless and located on the margins of mainstream and hegemonic discourses. He grapples with the problem of making epistemology practical and anchoring it to actual worlds of Africans. It centers itself in African Being and Time.1′ Civilizational historicism (Munford’s philosophical and methodological apparatus) is used to organize the field of investigation. This lens situates the investigator in the historical situation of black oppression and seeks to link the researcher to a historical body of ideas and methods of investigation that opposes black oppression. W.E.B. Du Bois is, for Munford, the critical predecessor to civilizational historicism. Munford’s robust commitment to science is Du Boisian, especially as it is encountered in such works as The Suppression of the African Slave Trade (1896) and Black Reconstruction (1935). And, like Du Bois, Munford is a foundational thinker. Which is to say he proceeds from stated assumptions, a discrete worldview, and a stated ideological stance. At the same time Munford constructs a multilayered approach to knowledge, attempting to capture the multiple determinations of the concrete realities of Africans.7

MUNFORD DEFINES THE EPISTEMIC MOMENT as one of inter-civilizational crisis, which is:

…brewing, maturing in the womb of the current international balance of power, in the belly of the global relations between races, as it were, a crisis destined to shatter the precarious “New World Order.” For Black folk, diasporan as well as African, the crux of the matter is global white supremacy. Over the next hundred years this emergency will, I predict, wrack the entire Earth. It will create wars, fuel the battle of ideas, rend traditional customs and tear at mores that, as the old usages, embody baseline moral values. The conflagration should most likely peak somewhere around the middle of the twenty-first century, culminating during its latter half.

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING an intra-civlilizational crisis within Western, or white civilization, the main aspect of the 21st century will be a maturing contradiction between Western civilization and the civilizations of the non-Western world-the majority of humanity. The historical trajectory, which Munford’s dialectical analysis foresees is a change of epochs; from the epoch of white supremacy and European hegemony to one of global social justice generally, and black liberation particularly. While Munford’s concern is the dialectics of the “black-white” contradiction, he asserts there are “huge cultural, social psychological, philosophical, ideological, mass emotional, and even sexual morality chasms between white Western and Chinese and South Asian civilizations, for all the talk of economic cooperation and interdependence” (3). Japan, he says, is the most glaring example of the clash of cultures, in spite of imperialist framed designations of Japan as “deputy-Aryan.” We should add, only after World War II and only conditioned upon Japan’s ruling elite playing within the framework of Western economic, political and military interests did this occur. This overarching determination of the epoch by the issue of race fits the Du Boisian thesis concerning the problem of the epoch as the color line. As such, and here Munford falls completely within the Du Boisian framework, all other contradictions and “problems” of this epoch are connected to the problem of “the color line.”8 Indeed, even the trajectories of class and socio-economic modes of production will be shaped within the fold of this over determining set of contradictions.9

MUNFORD ARGUES that much of the Western ideological and philosophical heritage is unusable to Africans because of the overarching influence of white supremacy. On the other hand, “valuable precursory ideas are imbedded in early African and Asian worldviews.” He asserts:

Not only are the roots of modern ideology and mythology to he found there, but indispensable concepts including law-bound necessity, sequential determination, development by means of contentions engagement between opposites, and the historicity of all social, economic, scientific and technological phenomena. The building blocks of civilizational historicism go bark to the Kemetic Egyptians, and to India and China.

Munford’s point is that civilizational historicism does not prioritize the “West,” or European ideas, in evaluating ideas. There are longer, and for him, more productive and profound traditions outside of Europe. He proposes therefore, a new interpretation of the history of ideas in away that prioritizes the past, present and future contributions of Africa and Asia. This part of Munford’s project is noteworthy on two levels. First, it suggests that the European intellectual project should not be considered on its own terms, from within its own framework, and thus it raises the possibility of evaluating European ideas from the vantage point of non-European ideologies and philosophies. secondly, it seeks to appropriate to contemporary black intellectual and political projects the rich, non-racist, heritages of Africa and Asia. And thus to appropriate for a black liberationist project, non-European knowledge. In this respect, Munford is suggesting that the ideological struggle with white supremacy is an aspect of the larger civilizational struggle with the West.’” Munford proposes what is an epistemic revolution, rooted in a rejection Western ideology. And by examining the world through the highly developed lenses of Africa and Asia, he argues, a different civilizational dimension could be imparted to knowledge.

MUNFORD IS CERTAINLY CORRECT in associating the black liberationist ideological struggle within the larger civilizational struggle with white supremacy. His ideology contains this critical genealogical dimension: to take from European ideas what is their “rational kernel,” their scientific, rational discoveries, and dispense with their racist shell. All the same, one must also answer the questions, where do European ideas begin and where do they intersect with or are foreshadowed by Afro-Asiatic ones. There is no clear demarcation. For instance, Aristotle is a part of the Afro-Asiatic civilizational and ideological developments of the 4th century BG. Aristotle could be read from the standpoint of the influences of Kemetic ideas upon ancient Greece. In a profound sense ancient and Hellenistic Greece was European in the sense of being proto-European. But it was actually connected to the Afro-Asian civilizational complex of the ancient world.

Furthermore, the European Renaissance and Enlightenment draw upon African and Arab civilizational interventions into ancient ideas; especially the Muslim appropriation of early thinkers like Aristotle and Aquinas. Nor can we be unmindful of the African American tradition, which has, at its best, appropriated and reconfigured bourgeois liberal, radical, socialist and communist ideas in ways that advance them beyond what their European framers initially conceived.

In a larger and yet largely unexplored sense, what is historically specific to European intellectual history should not be universalized; nor should we designate and thus confuse, the historically unique (i.e., European social and intellectual development) with the historically inevitable. The sequence of experiences that shape this path should not be confused with the only possible, or the sole significant path of development. The longer African and Asian historical trajectories should, as Munford suggests, be mined for their usefulness to contemporary struggles. I would go further, and assert that we are in a position to do two things at once, to both discover the rational and progressive kernels of European thought and mine the histories of African and Asian thought, leading to what must be a new synthesis, superseding both sides dialectically, and prefiguring humanity’s possible future ideological trajectories.

In this synthesis, different ideological paths become actual possibilities. In the most fundamental sense, the ideological relationships between human beings can be actualized differently, as other thinkable worlds become possible. However, these possibilities become concrete realities conditioned upon a fundamental rupture with the global system of white supremacy.

THIS ORIENTATION away from a dependence upon Eurocentric modalities of thinking affects three critical areas of social scientific analysis: political economy, political or state theory and the theory of class conflict. In all three areas, traditional European scholarship assumes as normal, white hegemony and Western civilization. In each instance, therefore, the racial and civilizational dimensions of capital accumulation, state formation and class conflict are Western and white. It is this “normal social science” that Munford challenges. Take for instance political economy. Capital accumulation and wealth creation assume the centrality of the white proletariat and white capital. Moreover, Munford views the capitalist system itself, when understood as a system, as a consequence of a series of actions and intentions of white people. Munford would insist that the material and ideological conditions for the emergences of capital, the European and white American proletariat and thus the capitalist system itself was the basis of the conflict with Africans in the struggle to capture, enslave and colonize them and later to colonize much of Asia. That the capitalist socio-economic formation was forged in the conflict with Africans over enslavement and the appropriation of African labor power as profit, suggests a different historical account of the rise of Europe and America than the traditional European-centered ones. And while certainly there are multiple factors determining the realities of modern capitalism, its form and content, even in the current moment of globalization, are inconceivable without the decisive role of African labor.11 Europeans enter Africa with a worldview and certain civilizational predispositions; predisposing them to accumulate capital in the most genocidal manner, committing crimes against humanity never before seen.12 For Munford, then, capitalist accumulation is a racianated or racialized system of accumulation. Capitalism is therefore not merely a system of exploitation, but most profoundly a system of racianated exploitation. It is a mode of production that has benefited, albeit in stratified and differentiated fashion, white people and the system of white supremacy generally and exploited Africans and other peoples of color. It is in essence a racianated mode of production.13 It is folded into a discrete civilization and conditioned by discrete worldviews and ideologies. Its civilizational predispositions, Munford argues, separate Western civilization in the manner of the development of human relationships from the rest of humanity. Thus the class conflict, for Munford, is a secondary part of the larger conflict against Western or white civilization and the modes of production constructed to uphold it. According to Munford, the logics of 21st-century history are therefore determined by the struggles to overturn the system of white supremacy and its accompanying racialized systems of production.

ULTIMATELY, Munford’s project stands or falls on the strength of its philosophical, especially its epistemological, foundations. The core philosophical issue is whether the central problem for the organization and evaluation of knowledge is race. And whether race, understood as physical race or as a social construction, is the overdetermining structure of modernity. Munford answers in the affirmative. Claims concerning macro-historical truth in his construal are overdetermined by race. This because race, especially as it organizes and is organized by the system of global white supremacy and its structures and mechanisms, is the generative structure of the modern epoch.

Knowledge is a matter of which side of the ideology of white supremacy one sits. Hence, truth for white supremacy is different than for anti-white supremacists. There are few if any universal social truths therefore. Knowledge, for Munford, is dynamic and emergent, rather than static and universal. Its dynamic and emergentist qualities are connected to the fact that humans, in making themselves, create truth and knowledge, as well as the contexts of knowledge. In this respect Munford’s thinking is dialectical. It is here that his thinking converges with Marxism in its Leninist form.14 Munford, however, ventures a bold relativism, one that renders a severe critique of European-centeredness and Europe’s claim to universality. In this regard Munford’s philosophical approach is centered upon epistemological concerns-what do we know and how do we come to know what we know?-yet with the condition that a praxis of resistance informs the discovery and presentation of truth and determines the subjective location of the investigator. However, the active intervention of the subject of knowledge, or the knower, is constantly reshaping the objects of knowledge. Knowing is therefore a process. However, Munford sees ideology as a central part of epistemology. We know the world, in this construal, not as pure thinkers or scientists, but as ideologically conditioned and determined agents. This dialectic between epistemology and ideology suggests that knowledge be viewed as an active part of the world transformative project.15 For Munford an African-centered philosophy must acknowledge its roots in the anti-white supremacist struggle. And must differentiate itself from the complex of white worldviews, which he variously identifies as white civilization and white supremacy. While Munford’s epistemology is dialectical and materialist and his ideology is anti-white supremacist and black liberationist his methodology is civilizational historicism.

METHODOLOGY is the central organizing dynamic of Munford’s work. Civilizational historicism, he insists, is secular and anti-fundamentalist and anti-dogmatic. Methodology is on one hand the mode of acquiring truth. On the other is the explanatory framework for evaluating and interpreting knowledge. Historical change and historical events and human behavior are explained through civilizational historicism. While Munford asserts that civilizational historicism is a political philosophy, I believe, after a close reading of the text, that it is a methodology for explaining large patterns of human behavior. First Munford acknowledges that history “has always been an invention.” And “is never an exact reconstruction of events.” And, finally “[h]istory is a project, but never a neutral colorblind project. In the American context it is always race conscious” (6). As a macro-historical project, civilizational historicism seeks to periodize African history and “pinpoint turning points.” And lastly, civilizational historicism “unfolds in conformity with objective regularities, rooted in the relationship of one group to another” and “history’s patterns are the large and long-range manifestations of human action” (9).

From a methodological standpoint Munford is compelled to engage two distinct yet interconnected and mutually dependent levels. First is the historical a priori-that is, civilization and second, history itself. The historical a priori is all those things that shape human action, the intentional and unintentional, the conscious and subconscious, the real and the magical or surreal. History is the narrative of those events. Thus the historical a priori is the structural side of the methodology and the historical narrative is the presentation of the concrete forms and processes inherent to a particular epoch.16

THIS LEADS US TO A DISCUSSION of historical ontology. I consider civilizational historicism to be a form of historical ontology.17 Historical ontology is a way of speaking about and understanding social phenomena, as they exist in historical time. Civilizational historicism is a way of understanding African historical Being understood in African historical time. It seems that Munford’s method works best in this robust relativist manner, especially as it links Time and Being to the unique and specified historical space occupied by Africans in the epoch beginning with the trans-Atlantic slave trade. However, the historical a priori, i.e., the civilizational dimension, would insist upon pinpointing those beliefs, values, modes of production, culture, etc. that precede the African holocaust of slavery and colonialism.

In modern history European cultures and peoples have congealed as a white civilization that stands apart from the rest of humanity. The racialization of civilizations (not just peoples) is the decisive outcome of the socio-historical processes associated with modernity. Therefore, white civilization, and the civilizational commitment to and predisposition among the majority of the world’s white people to white supremacy, overdetermine the modern epoch. Civilization in practical methodological terms is the totality of those things that are the historical a priori; it is what is considered the deep structure. The historical object to be understood is the specific dialectics of African Time and Being conditioned by African civilization and by its negation, white supremacy and European capitalism.

Civilizational historicism tries to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism so often associated with certain forms of Afro-centrism, while preserving the category of essentiality as a part of the understanding of reality and the working up of knowledge. More importantly, what Munford seeks to capture in the historical a priori, are those conditions that determine the historical moment, or the historical epoch. The historical a priori of white or European civilization for Munford is white supremacy, on one side, and African civilization on the other. In other words, white civilization exists as a dialectical relationship between white supremacy and African civilization.18

THERE ARE SOME who have found Munford’s turn to a sharper focus upon race as the central dynamic in modern world history to be a retreat from his views found in such works as Production Relations and Black Liberation. I am sure that Munford views his work, starting with Black Ordeal and Race and Reparations and the current volume, to be further developments of his understanding of history and the evolution of historiography. Race and Civilization does not retreat on matters of a materialist historiography, the uses of political economic categories and analysis, or on his ideological commitments to black liberation. What we have is an evolution of a project that started when Munford was a graduate student in the former German Democratic Republic. At the same time theories and methodologies can mutate and change. This is reflected in the history of individual and collective human thought. These variations and mutations, the processes of ideational evolutions, occur within historical contexts, and are advanced as thinkers with specific race, class and national locations mature. The scientific and intellectual maturation of thinkers is a necessary part of innovation within research programs. If nothing else, the logic of the notion of the centrality of black liberation to world history compels a scientific flexibility and innovation. Moreover, all theories should be regularly be subjected to critique and reexamination.

FURTHERMORE, the objects of race inquiry themselves are constantly evolving and mutating. Races, as Du Bois understood, are dynamic historically constituted social and cultural groups. Races are subject to mutations, sometimes quite dramatic ones. Just as races mutate, so do racial identities. Methodologies must similarly evolve and mutate to account for this. The idea of absolute and unchanged epistemologies and methodologies goes against the grain of scientific and philosophical inquiry. Thomas Kuhn drew attention to this, capturing the mutability and changes of paradigms, including at times the emergence of revolutionary and subversive paradigms. Imre Lakatos spoke of the evolutionary processes whereby research programs and the research landscape experience challenges that lead them to new revolutionary research programs and new possibilities for thought and research. Munford’s work seems to be part of the evolutionary process of changing the ways we think and do research on Africans.

MOST OFTEN, historical research and historical writing proceeds quite conventionally. It is then quite simply a narrative, often without explicitly stating its philosophical or ideological commitments. In this respect the historical object and historian are unified, and reified together. There has been recently a trend to a more existential historical narrative. This modality proceeds often through biography. There is a surrealistic turn where history is a type of narrative about dreams and visions. Some construct black history and being as encounters with absurdity as a way of explaining black consciousness in its encounters with white supremacy. Marxist historiography, historical materialism, is more often seen in its influence upon conventional and existential narratives of black history than as a full-blown project. Each of these stances, the absurdist existentialist and the Marxist, at its best, suggests a moment in the attempt to capture the historical object/subject-African and African American resistance. In certain senses each manifests a political moment. In the current situation of scientific and scholarly efforts to explain race and black oppression the angles of observation have been multiplied. However, the richness of academic discourse is often limited by the convention of seeking to stand above ideology and deep commitments. This is especially the case for black thinkers who are more closely policed by the academic gatekeepers and thought police in the elite white academy. This desire not to appear to be “one-sided” lends itself to reification and solipsism. A good part of this goes under the banner of post-structuralism and postmodernism. However, each suspends concerns with the object of history and turns to a single-minded engagement with its subject. They possess a concern with the subject in ways that suggest the only verifiable reality is subjective. Munford’s materialist historiography and his insistence upon the crucial role of political economy in macro social explanation is his way of countering this trend.19

AMONG MORE RECENT black academic philosophers none has been so committed to existentialism or phenomenological inquiry as has Lewis Gordon [see especially his Fanon and the Crisis of European Man (1995)]. By placing Gordon’s historiography along side Munford’s it is possible to explore the revolutionary possibilities of both. Munford’s project is a radical one, rooted in political economy, historical materialism and structuralism. Munford seeks to provide through the philosophy and methodology of civilizational historicism a way to investigate global white supremacy and black liberation. For Munford the critical dialectic is between white supremacy and black liberation. Munford deploys structuralism in two ways. First to designate what is in effect the historical a priori, white supremacy, and secondly to pinpoint white supremacy as the generative mechanism of the modern world. To restate, the historical a priori is that set of conditions, what Munford designates civilization, which precedes and determines the current historical epoch. The historical a priori is itself historically constituted, and congeals as that set of generative structures that are determinative of the present moment in history. This moment for Munford is defined as the epoch of global white supremacy. Its foundation is white civilization. In the West the decisive dialectic is between white supremacy and black liberation. Blacks include Africans, Caribbean, Central and South Americans and European blacks. Globally there is an unresolved dialectic contradiction between white supremacy and peoples of color generally. The maturing of this contradiction defines the revolutionary process itself and the future of humanity. It is apparent that Munford’s work draws upon Marxism and at the same time supersedes it.20 Munford reconfigures Marxism and structuralism to produce a new social science he designates civilizational historicism. A social science that is ideologically partisan to the cause of black liberation.

GORDON CONFIGURES social science as a science of the human being. Gordon appropriates an existential reading of Marxism from Sartre and Fanon. Phenomenology is Gordon’s method of investigation. Gordon wishes to study the human being in the current epoch, that is, before she/he is fully human. Indeed, Gordon’s project is historical to the extent it is concerned with the historical a priori, which for Gordon is the individual under conditions of limited possibilities, or in conditions of racial subordination and domination. Gordon’s ideological commitments are to humanity, i.e., human liberation, which can occur as a consequence of the revolutionary transformation of the conditions of human existence. However, this process must begin with the transformation of human consciousness. In the first instance this demands the undermining of bad faith as the principle condition of white consciousness. To the extent that Gordon’s project engages history it is as micro history, biography or the history of consciousness. This is Fanonian and Foucaultian at the same time.

“WHITE CIVILIZATION and European culture” insists Frantz Fanon, “have forced an existential deviation on the Negro.” W.E.B Du Bois argues that from within the folds of this Fanonian “existential deviation” the Negro invents himself through resistance. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction should be read as a study of how this resistance determined, or indeed, overdetermined, the geography of American history, where the conflict is triangular at the level of political events (the North, the South, and the Negro). As this conflict exemplifies, the ongoing dialectic of race and white supremacy, of white oppression and black liberation, is at its core. For both Du Bois and Fanon, the issue is the epistemology of African Being. Du Bois sees African American Being as historically constituted in the vortex of resistance and race conflict and Fanon observes the psychological and identity problems created by white supremacy for Africans. Each is an instance of explaining African Being; each asserts an epistemology of Black Being. Munford draws on each, but uses methods of analysis associated with Du Bois’s historicism. What we end with is the understanding that African reality is complex, demanding complex theories and methods, requiring multiple angles of observation. African reality is the result of multiple determinations, some specific to the African world and African consciousness, others to global realities.

THESE DETERMINATIONS, however, rather than being static, are fluid and changing. There is a dynamic and complex interaction of forces, processes and events that determine African Time and Being. What Munford does is to insist that through historical and political economic analysis, anchored in an ideological commitment to black liberation a new movement for liberation is possible. “Multiple determinativeness” expresses the existence of multiple possibilities within the framework of dialectical complexity. “Dialectical complexity” denotes a heterarchical or multiple, rather than a hierarchical, system of determinations and causation. In a moment of acute and dynamic dialectical complexity (what Stephen Jay Gould calls punctuated equilibrium) the situation tends to instability and fluidity, yielding conditions for revolutionary ruptures within the global social system.21 In an earlier review of Munford’s work I stated:

Thus a profound revolutionary crisis, of the type Munford suggests is necessary to undermine the global white supremacist system, will involve a situation where, conceivably, civilizational events and levels conflict with political and ideological events; where economic events and civilizational events conflict. Here the moment is determined heterarchically, rather than hierarchically. Rather than single determinations, there are multiple determinations, where the movement of the system is determined not from its equilibrium state, or balance, but far from equilibrium; by what has been referred to as chaotic dynamics.

In the end this is what civilizational historicism seeks to understand and explain.

Endnotes

1. There are several significant bodies of philosophy that can be appropriated to this project. Among them are classical works within the field of existentialist philosophy. Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness are valuable because of their explorations of the time and being dialectic at the level of the individual’s engagement with the moment, or the epoch. However, at the level at which Munford operates, Hegel’s Logic is unavoidable. Munford is well aware of Hegel’s profound impact upon historiography, especially as it concerns history as a dialectical process. But then there is Fanon whose “sociogeny” (1967:11) or sociogenetic analysis is acutely attuned to time. Writing in Black Skin While Mash, he says, “The architecture of this work is rooted in the temporal. Every human problem must be considered from the standpoint of time” (12). Ian Hacking’s uses of Foucault are a helpful intervention into our understanding of micro-historical processes, location and situating the observer. Molefi Asante’s Afrocentrism is a postmodern situational or location theory. Centrism in his understanding is a way for the observer to locate for her/himself the appropriate angle for engaging the objects of analysis.

2. As I have noted in endnote 1 there are important existential interrogations of the modern European concept of time and progress. However, the natural sciences, from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, to evolutionary biology and population genetics, interrogate time. A very significant contribution to this is Stephen Jay Gould’s work, especially his magnum opus, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2002). What I suggest about the particularity of space-time realities as they are encountered in socio-historical time and sociostructural time, Gould calls “time tiering” (see especially pp. 1320-1332 and the section “The Paradox of the First Tier: Towards A General Theory of Tiers of Time”). He insists that from a theoretical standpoint such a recognition allows for both macro-structural and phenomenological levels of investigation. His point is that not only does time express itself differently dependent upon the structural level, but that we encounter distinct modalities of time in the course of scientific investigation. Time tiering is necessary in understanding stratified social structures and how social classes, races, nations and other social collectives understand and are conscious of social structure and social transformation.

3. Once rational explanation references notions such as the a priori we are immediately in the realm of Kantianism and ultimately structuralism. With Munford the issue is not merely to explain the modalities of rational thought, but to construct a practical way of discussing and explaining racial oppression. Ian Hacking asserts that the historical a priori “points at conditions on the possibility of knowledge (2003:5).” For Munford the historical a priori is race and white supremacy: the conditions that make possible the structures of the modern world or current epoch, and thus condition the boundaries of explanation. This is what Bourdieu calls structuring structures, which overdetermine the conditions of knowledge.

4. My understanding of the modalities of structural, structuration, macro and micro logics is highly influenced by Kyriakos M Kontopulos’s The Logics of Social Structure (1993). His evaluation of the seminal nature of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, especially his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) has been important to my analysis of structuration theory and micro-logical and meso-logical analysis. In particular Bourdieu’s drawing the attention of theorists to the possibilities of understanding the behaviors of socio-historical structures as heterarchical rather than solely hierarchical. This appropriation of Marx’s idea of the multiple determinations of concrete historical reality is the significant point for me. Marx’s formulation suggests a heterarchical determination of reality. There is a dynamic dialectic sense of things wherein the structuring process, or structuration, takes place through a process of multiple indeterminacies. Hence, determination through indeterminacies. In this account the strategic intervention of agents, in Munford’s case collective agents identified as races, are critical to the structuration process. The deep structural level, the level of civilization, is possibly a dynamic structure, which is subject to the logics of structuration and indeterminacy. Civilization, Munford’s deep structure, should be subject to the same possibilities of determination through multiple indeterminacies as are other structures. This possibility seems to be a necessary consideration if the possibility of revolutionary disjuncture is to become a possibility. Indeed, the moment of revolutionary rupture is at this precise moment of instability.

5. Rather than local, folk, or micro-history, Munford believes that macro or global historical analysis is appropriate to a scientific African historiography and to coming forward with practical solutions to this global problem. This epistemology of history differs profoundly from, let us say, existentialism, phenomenology and psychoanalytical methods of approaching history.

6. In my “Being an African in the World: The Du Boisian Epistemology” (2000) I attempt to demonstrate how Du Bois shaped his scholarship as investigations of African Being and African Time. I have argued this represented a transgessive intervention into traditional metaphysics and ontology. I here suggest that Du Bois was attempting to make epistemology practical. This linking of epistemology to social change for Du Bois occurred through concretizing it and though Du Bois did not state it in this way, linking it to ideology. Du Bois, for instance, argues that history is propaganda. I take his use of the word propaganda to mean what we would call ideology.

7. This notion of the multiple determination of the concrete is taken form Karl Marx’s Grundrisse (1973). It is worth noting that the turn from a concern with the concrete or the material world, as it were, and a turn to primary concern with the subjective and psychological is a modality of doing the human sciences most associated with post structuralism, surrealism, magical realism and certain forms of existentialism. It represents a certain suspension of the concrete in order to “better understand the subject of history.” An important aspect of this turn is the linguistic turn and hermeneutics, or narrative interpretation.

8. Three recent studies show (and these certainly are only representative of a large and growing field), the global nature of the color line and its determining role in constructing the modern epoch and the world economic and political systems. Gerald Horne’s Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire (2004), Paul Kramer’s “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910″ (March, 2002) and Joseph K. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade Economic Development, (2002). Each is a type of revisionist history in that it expands our understanding of the role of race in events as divergent as Japan’s war in the Pacific 1937-1945, the slave trade and slavery and the creation of the modern British economy and race and race ideology and the Atlantic alliance and empire.

9. Gerald Home makes a parallel point. In a number of essays and now in his Race War: While Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire (2004), he asserts that Asia in the 21st century constitutes a central, if not the central, location of the struggle against white supremacy. Munford would suggest that the struggle against white supremacy in the current moment will, of necessity, be Afro-Asiatic. He believes that a worldview in keeping with African and African American interest and struggle is what is required. Asians will, of course, construct the world and science in terms that reflect their interests and specific encounters with global white supremacy.

10. Again it must be stated that Munford considers Western civilization to be a marker for white civilization, whose essence he defines as white supremacist.

11. Walter Rodney’s thesis concerning the destructive dialectics that this encounter occasioned for Africans is worth considering. At the end of the day, the African social structure and modes of production were not undeveloped, but ruined. Hence, for the world capitalist system to develop, Africa and Africans had to be ruined. Advancing a thesis similar to Rodney’s (1970, 1981), Joseph Inikori (2002) presents a study demonstrating that English industrialization could not have taken place and experienced its profound and accelerated growth without the wealth accumulated in the transAtlantic Slave trade and plantation slavery in the “New World.” Manning Marable (1983) appropriated Rodney’s thesis and applied it to Black America, arguing that American capitalism forces underdevelopment upon Black America.

12. It is worth noting Munford’s three-volume study, The Black Ordeal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625-1715 (1991), which documents the genocidal nature of the initial accumulation of European capital on the backs of the exploitation of Africans. Munford here argues that the modern forms of racism were forged in the process of slave trading. Munford calls its most virulent form sadoracism.

13. This idea of a racialized system, or racianated processes of social and institutional behavior, can mean several things. In its most robust formulation it means that race trumps class and social structures in explaining the nature and functioning of the system. A less robust position might suggest an inherent dialectic between race, class, gender and nation (see Patricia Hill Collins (2000) for a discussion of intersectionality). This less robust claim might support a certain form of black Marxism that understands class as being filtered through race and race being filtered through class the notion of the race/class dialectic. There is a liberal/ social democratic version of this race/class dialectic associated with the research of William Julius Wilson. His version goes so far as to claim that race as a social category is declining in significance in United States race and class relationships. Lastly, there is a functionalist view that has Marxist and liberal variants that argues that race and racism are merely super-structural, ideological or belief system variables. In this version racism is not fundamental to the operations and functions of the system.

14. This trend remains a rich area of approaches to issues of dialectics and the modalities of the transformation of material reality, especially social relationships. It is generally associated with the Soviet Academy and its leading philosophers, particularly E. V. Ilyenkov [The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's Capital (1982)] and T. I. Oizerman [Problems in the History of Philosophy (1973) and The Main Trends in Philosophy (1988)]. The emphasis placed upon materiality, temporality, knowability, and totalities, at least from the standpoint of social theory, overcomes the problems of idealist metaphysics addressed by pragmatism. Lenin’s most important philosophical observations are found in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and Philosophical Notebooks, in particular his Notebooks on Hegel’s Logic.

15. Richard Rorty (see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1979]) and neo-pragmatism’s critique of positivism is precisely at the point where positivism denies the need for a practical metaphysics that establishes modalities of praxis and engagement with the world. The problem with neo-pragmatism is that it discards foundations of thought and explanation all together. Among these are not just metaphysical foundations, but ideological foundations as well. Lewis Gordon’s reading of Fanon [see Fanon and the Crisis of European Man (1995)] moves in a parallel direction to Cornel West’s prophetic pragmatism [see The American Evasion of Philosophy (1989)]. In one or another way micro level human relationships, micro power dynamics and culture, rather than rationality and foundations define the philosophical project.

16. Alfred Schmidt’s History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist Structuralist Theories of History (1983) parallels Munford’s methodology. The notion of reality consisting of both structure and dialectics is key to Schmidt’s understanding of dialectics. In Munford’s and Schmidt’s construal the pragmatist and hermeneutic preoccupation with thinking without foundations defies the possibility of scientific knowledge. Pragmatism, in contrast to Schmidt’s view, is about talk and not the modalities of social transformation.

17. I have encountered the term “historical ontology” in the works of the philosopher Ian Hacking (2003). His is a philosophical investigation of the uses of history in understanding the genealogies of ideas. His project is rooted in a Foucaultian understanding of the contexts and sociology of ideas. The existential philosopher Martin Heidegger precedes Foucault in attempting to understand the historical conditionalities of Being and what Hacking calls the historical ontological. Munford inverts the idealist and subjectivist stance of Heidegger, Foucault and Hacking by designating historical Being as historically constituted concrete collectives, i.e., races, civilizations, classes and nations.

18. In Black Skin White Mask (1967:12) Fanon identifies ” a massive psycho existential complex,” that is European or white civilization. Its existence assumes the African, or African civilization, as objects of white history. By removing the African from history as subject or agent you distort her/his historical consciousness, designating it false or pathology consciousness, or as with Hegel, outside of history, because the African stands outside world consciousness, lacking human identity. Munford’s project assumes the centrality of what Fanon recognizes, the centrality of black folk to the existence of the white world system and their centrality to its destruction. Lewis Gordon, in Franz Fanon and the Crisis of European Man, understands his own intellectual project as a disruptive intervention into European consciousness in the Fanonian sense. Gordon believes the study and clarification of black and white consciousness will be a contribution to white supremacy’s downfall.

19. The turn to the centrality of the fictive in understanding black realities in some ways suggests this turn. Moreover, the modern ways of constructing the novel using surrealism and magical realism is a way of taking the characters of the novel away from objective historical reality and inventing them out of imagined, sometimes improvised, absurdist realities. Objective history is suspended for the sake of the novel. The concerns are with the characters’ understandings or their confusions with their multiple subjective or psychological realities.

20. Here it is useful to recall Oliver Cromwell Cox’s Caste, Class and Race (1948). Munford’s work in some ways can be read as a discussion with Cox’s class-race dialectic, where class and class conflict determine race relationships. Michael Banton (1987:171-175) locates Cox’s work in the European class project and places it within the context of European epistemological concerns. It can be shown that what Cox wishes to explain is different from what Munford seeks to explain. They differ moreover, in how they identify the principal events in history. For Cox the explanandum is class and class conflict; for Munford it is race and the conflict with global white supremacy. For Cox history is dialectically understood as the history of class conflict; for Munford modern history is the history of race conflict. At the same time, Cox’s work has its genealogy in black Marxism of the 1920s and 30s, especially the works of Abrams Harris, E. Franklin Frazier and Ralph Bundle (see Holloway, Confronting the Veil).

21. In a review of Munford’s Race, and Reparation I argued that his civilizational procedure predisposes analysis to a hierarchical, top-down, modality and towards reliance upon single determinations. This cause-effect, linear or deductive nomological approach to explanation does not easily or readily grasp the complexity of socio-historical realities, their heterarchical or multideterminative nature, in a situation of dialectical complexity and rapid movement and change in all levels of the global system. In many respects as the global system of white supremacy and capitalism has become interconnected and is intertwined with civilizational, economic and ideological events and processes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and therefore become more complex, we are forced to adopt less deterministic modes of explaining this system. Rather than strict causalities, we are dealing more often with probabilities and far from equilibrium dynamics.

Works Cited

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Banton, Michael, Racial Theories (Second Edition) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Cox, Oliver Cromwell, Caste, Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics (New York: Monthly Review, 1948 [1970]).

Du Bois, W. E. B., The Suppression of the African-Slave Trade to the United States of America 1638-1870 (1896). In W. E. B. Du Bois: Writings, ed. Nathan Huggins (New York: Library of America, 1986).

_____. Black Reconstruction in America (New York: Atheneum, 1935 [1992]).

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_____. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan from the French (New York: Vintage, 1977).

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_____. “Du Bois’s Humanistic Philosophy of Human Sciences” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000).

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Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time. Translation of Sein und Zeit by Joan Stambaugh. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1953 [1996]).

Collins, Patricia Hill, “Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy.” In The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000).

Horne, Gerald, Race War!: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

Holloway, Jonathan Scott, Confronting The Veil: Abram Harris Jr., E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche, 1919-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

Ilyenkov, E. V., The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capital (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982).

Inikori, Joseph E., Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Kramer, Paul, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and the United States Empires, 1880-1910.” In The Journal of American History (2002). Online http://www.historycooperative. org/journals/jah88.4/kramer.html.

Kontopoulos, Kyriakos, The Logics of Social Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

Lakatos, Imre, and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Marable, Manning, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1983 [2000]).

Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage, 1973).

Monteiro, Anthony, “Being an African in the World: The Du Boisian Epistemology.” In The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000).

_____ . 2000(b). “Prolegomenon to a Sociology of the Du Boisian Episteme” MS.

_____. 1999. “Race, Class and Civilization: On Clarence J. Munford’s Race, and Reparations,” Black Scholar, Vol. 29, No. 1.

Munford, Clarence J., Race and Civilization: Rebirth of Black Centrality (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001).

_____. Race and Reparations: A Black Perspective for the 21st Century (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996).

_____. The Black (Meal of Slavery and Slave Trading in the French West Indies, 1625-17/5, 3 volumes. (Lewiston, PA: The Edwin Meilen Press, 1991).

_____. Production Relations, Class and Black Liberation: A Marxist Perspective in Afro-American Studies (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner Publishing Co, 1978).

Oizerman, T. I., The Main Trends in Philosophy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984).

_____, A. S. Bogomolov, Principles of the Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy. Translated by H. Campbell Creighton (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983).

_____. Problems in the History of Philosophy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973).

Outlaw, Lucious, On Race and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996).

Rodney, Walter, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1981).

_____. A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

Rorty, Richard, “Habermas, Derrida, and the Function of Philosophy.” In Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

_____. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992 [1943]).

Schmidt, Alfred, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History. Translated by Jeffrey Herf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982).

Spillers, Hortense J., Black and While and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

West, Cornel, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

Copyright Black World Foundation Fall 2004

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THE EXISTENTIAL CRISIS OF US CAPITALISM: A MOMENTO MORI

In 2006—2009 the US financial system and economy came close to systemic collapse. Had it occurred most of the world would have gone down with it. Karl Marx famously described events like these as “momenti mori”, reminders of systemic death. This was the first truly existential crisis of the capitalist economic system since the Great Depression, and it reminds us of its near death fragility.

The financial system has been stabilized; we’re in the middle of a jobless recovery, the threat of a double dip recession and decades of stagnation loom ahead. Stag deflation (a dangerous combination of stagnation and falling prices), and the threat of sovereign debt default, (the federal government unable to pay its creditors, like China and other nations holding US bonds) is possible. Millions of people will never recover under current policies. Nouriel Roubini’s and Stephen Mihm’s Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance is a sophisticated, analytical, yet readable, look at the crisis and its aftermath. They assure us, “capitalism did not collapse”. It took the government pumping over $12 trillion into banks, investment firms, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, money markets and carmakers to “save capitalism”.

The US was the eye of the storm and the source of the collapse. While the banks and global centers of finance have for the time being been stabilized, the eye of the storm has shifted to sovereign debt. The federal debt, the authors say, “ will effectively double as a share of the nation’s gross domestic product as the deficits in coming decades are expected to hit $9 trillion or more (178)”, reaching 90% of GDP. If the federal government is viewed by nations like China as not credit worthy and thus refuse to lend us money, social calamity might follow, as the federal government reneges on its obligations to its citizens. Many state governments have already reached this point.

The fate of American capitalism is now heavily dependent upon global economic developments, especially in the emerging markets and in particular China. Emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) and lately South Africa (BRICS) are driving the global economy and are the hope for sustained recovery. A major geopolitical and geo-economic shift was underway before the crisis, but has accelerated since. A sixty-five year period has ended. US economic and political hegemony and the dominance of the US dollar have come to a screeching end. Martin Jacques in his influential When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order argues, humanity is entering the Age of China. Roubini and Mihm agree. They speculate that the dollar in the not that distant future could be replaced by the Chinese renmimbi as the principal world currency. Few would argue that by 2030 China, now the second largest economy in the world (having this Spring surpassed Japan) will surpass the US. China ‘s continuing high rates of economic growth and its global standing among developing and developed nations, its alternative way of doing business (what is called the Beijing Consensus), makes it the attractive alternative to the US, IMF, the World Bank, the European Central Bank and Western financial and banking institutions. The Chinese remnmbi is increasingly the go to currency. Nothing, in this regard, is more dramatic than the China-Africa summits and China’s vast infrastructure investment throughout Africa.

This irreversible shift in all probability will be a messy affair, occasioning in the West sovereign debt default, currency crashes, crumbling markets, bank failures, exploding unemployment and underemployment and political and social unrest. Roubini and Mihm warn, “The status quo is unsustainable and dangerous and absent some difficult reforms it will unravel. Indeed, if the Unites States doesn’t get its fiscal house in order and start saving more, it’s headed for a nasty reckoning. When that reckoning will come is anyone’s guess, but the notion that it might be put off for decades is delusional. Indeed, some signs suggest that the tide is already beginning to shift (251).” What the authors call “difficult reforms” I call bold and purposeful action and planning, entailing fundamental alterations of the structures of US capitalism and finance. The authors urge in the short term a quick rebalancing of the global economy. China and Germany, for example, should consume more, and the US, Britain, Spain and Ireland, for example, should consume less, borrow less and save more. However, this only alters the context for the type of deep structural changes that must take place in the US and the West. But without a rebalancing of the global economy and establishing a new global equilibrium, the whole thing could snap. The next crisis would be worse and more than the garden-variety boom and bust cycle. “It would be,” they sat “ less a function of capitalism’s inherent instability than a deep ebb and flow of geo-political power. “ Actually, it would be a combination of both. Such an unraveling would constitute an earthquake and would occasion “a rapid, disorderly decline of the dollar (255).” Geo-economic and geo-political changes along with structural, cyclical and financial crises could produce a 21st century Great Depression The current crisis, therefore, rather than a once in a life time event, might be a taste of things to come.

The origins of this crisis are in modern capitalism. It is inherent in the nature of 20th and 21st century capitalism. Up to recently the US avoided the worst of Western capitalism’s crises. Europe was the epicenter. It experienced economic depressions and two world wars, European civil wars for dominance of the colonial world. These events evidenced new and deep contradictions within the world system. At the same time policies that supported banks becoming dominant and merging with the state were crucial. The financialization of the US economy, and the deregulation of Wall Street are decisive to the architecture of early 21st century US capitalism. The American (and British) free market model unleashed finance capital to do its thing on society. The most predatory, parasitic and criminal elements of Wall Street and bank capital became dominant over the economy and the government. Certainly, Bush II’s insane tax cuts for the richest 2% and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars worsened the problem of government debt and set the immediate context of the current crisis.

The economist Rudolph Hilferding pointed to the dangers of an economic structure where bank capital is dominant and the state becomes its protector and facilitator. A new capitalist economic structure results; a more exploitative and globalized system. He called this new arrangement finance capitalism. Lenin appropriated Hilferding’s analysis, adding that the new capitalist arrangement quickened the process of the export of capital to the colonial world, making colonies a part of the global system of capitalist production.

After World War II the US became the center of world capitalism and global politics, the dollar the major currency. American triumphalists named this the American Century. With the recent financial meltdown and the Great Recession all that has ended. Yet, we’re left with the outgrowth of finance capitalism, a vampire economy that competes with and sucks the blood of the real or productive economy. The logic of the vampire economy is that while it lives on the real economy, it will eventually take it down

The vast economy of derivatives and the market in debt and especially subprime mortgages are means by which the vampire economy sucks the life out of working people, the middle class s and the real economy. The financial meltdown began in the subprime market, but that was merely the most obvious sign of what Roubini and Mihn call systemic rot. The economic boom that preceded the collapse was a speculative bubble. The onset of recession in 2007 exposed fragility in the mortgage markets, which set off a chain of events that culminated in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. It shook the edifice of the entire world financial system. The US, drowning in debt and overleveraged, was the source of the collapse. The banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds etc increased their indebtedness from 22% of GDP in 1981 to 117% in 2008. Private debt overall went from 123% of GDP in 1981 to 290% in 2008. Economist Hymar Minsky pointed out the greater the reliance on debt the more fragile the financial system (see Roubini/Mihm pp82—83).

In a previous essay I supported Joseph Stieglitz’ calls for a restructuring of the US economy from the free market to a social market economy model, with tough regulations on Wall Street and the banks. I argued that this Keynesian model should be viewed as a transition to a socialist market economy as a stage to a developed socialist economy. I proposed a tough minded Keynesianism (a Keynesian/socialist synthesis), that would break up the “too big to fail banks” and nationalize their parts. The guts of their predatory impulses would be cut out. Like Roubini/Nihm and Stieglitz I agree that the state has to be the decisive player in the economy. However, the state and political systems must be democraticized, and made instruments of people’s needs, rather than of finance capitalism.

The first priority of the economy has to be the needs of the people. Thus an industrial and infrastructure development plan has to be instituted. The people have to give substance to Barack Obama’s green economy idea. Immediately we need a 21st century Works Project Administration that puts people to work on green and infrastructure projects. This must be a multi decade program, with planned and targeted government stimulus.

The US people will need help from the world to reconstruct our economy and society. China and other emerging economies can invest in this reconstruction. Their experiences with state capitalism and the socialist market economy will be helpful. Ideologically the US people have to recognize that we have moved from the Age of Europe and US hegemony to the Age of Humanity, where we must cooperate as an equal among other peoples and civilizations.

More than anything the US people have to initiate a great democratic movement that draws on the movements of the 1930’s and the 1960’s and 70’s, with the aim of creating a people’s democracy, and democratic culture, which takes over the mechanisms of the state. It must be a peace, anti-racist and social justice movement. It must target the military industrial and prison industrial complexes for dismantling. The military budget must quickly be cut by 75% and become a domestic jobs and rebuilding budget.

Roubini and Mihm state that American capitalism will never be what it once was. They conclude that the US financial system has to be reformed and restructured. China, they insisted, will be the major economic and geopolitical player in coming decades. What they do not argue for is a change from a rotten economic structure to a new one. It seems obvious that the existential crisis of US capitalism logically suggests that an alternative has to be considered. A new economic system is what is called for. Like W.E.B Du Bois I believe that system will be socialist.

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PAUL ROBESON A HEROIC FIGURE AND MARTIN DUBERMAN’S FAILED BIOGRAPHY

Paul Robeson was one of the extraordinary figures of our time. He was a man of exceptional intellect and perception, unshakable courage and boundless love for and generosity towards African Americans, working people and the colonized masses. His life and work achieved world historic significance. The son of a slave, the youngest child in a family of five, Robeson’s life work drew upon both his African and African American cultural roots. His accomplishments are breathtaking. Paul Robeson was a scholar, athlete, Phi Beta Kappan, linguist, Africanist, civil rights fighter, peace activist, working class partisan, actor and singer. As Ossie Davis commented, he was the crystallization of socialist man; the embodiment, as it were, of the human being of the future. He was a learned and civilized human being, an internationalist and a revolutionary. He learned over twenty-five languages from linguistic groups as varied as Russian, Mandarin Chinese, Zulu, Yoruba, Egyptian and German. Emma Goldman, said he spoke Russian like a Russian. Learning languages was indispensable to Robeson’s larger scientific pursuit of the universal foundations of what he considered a single world civilization. His deepening appreciation of the folk heritage that is common to all national cultures, led him, ineluctably, to a more profound respect for the enormous achievements of African and African American civilization. Hence in the early 1930′s when asked what he wanted to be, he replied, “I want to be an African”. He became a partisan of the Bandung, or Afro-Asian solidarity movement. And would in his famous book Here I Stand call for Black Power as indispensable to the African Americans struggle for freedom.

Paul Robeson increasingly discovered that human cultures are not solely, or necessarily only the product of nations. He sought out the inevitable class foundations of national cultures. Robeson was drawn, therefore, to folk culture as the common underpinning of world civilization. Folk culture was for him the necessary material foundation of so-called high culture or “classical” culture, which almost inevitably had been appropriated by the ruling classes. Robeson believed, moreover, that for humanity to realize its true potential and occasion a renaissance of world civilization, the scourge of racism and imperialism would have to be eliminated from human history. The logic of this understanding drew him inevitably to the struggle for human emancipation. Having grasped the fundamental essence and global dimensions of oppression he never retreated from the struggle against it. For Robeson it was not enough merely to interpret the world, he dedicated his life to its revolutionary transformation. In February of 1999 the Public Broadcasting System aired a major documentary on the life and work of Robeson. It presented Robeson and especially his wife and comrade in arms Eslanda Goode Robeson in a truer light. For this reason I wish to revisit the only major biography of Robeson currently available; Martin Duberman’s 1989 804-page book titled simply Paul Robeson.

Martin Bauml Duberman’s biography of Paul Robeson is important if for no other reason than the significance of its subject. In the last instance, however, Duberman’s effort fails to grasp Paul Robeson and the meaning of his life. Duberman is the first historian given full access to the Robeson estate, which consists of some fifty thousand documents. He claims to have interviewed close to 135 people.

Methodologically Duberman’s work is a pscho-biography. In this respect Duberman attempts to construct a psychological portrait of Robeson; to disclose, what the author considers the “inner Robeson”. The “inner Robeson” is for Duberman a tangle of pscho-sexual contradictions. Thus a major organizing theme of this work is an attempt to “recreate” Robeson’s sexual life. The primary evidence for this recreation is hearsay and gossip. The point, however, is that much of this is fictionalized . In the end the historically significant is intertwined with and often takes a back seat to the purely trivial. Duberman creates a mind body duality where in the end Robeson’s mind and intellect are the victims to his uncontrolled passions. Robeson is ultimately rendered pathetic, tragic and dogmatic. Never is the reader able through this maze glimpse the vital core of Robeson enormous genius. Not once does Duberman even suggest the scientific rigor that guided Robeson’s study of areas as varied as harmonic theory and world politics. Finally, Duberman is silent concerning Robeson’s fresh discoveries and contributions to the scientific understanding of world cultures, history and music. Robeson emerges from Duberman’s book as a man far less than he was in real life. Indeed, he is reduced beyond recognition. Yet, in the final analysis, the book breaks little new ground in the study of Robeson’s life.

Duberman lack of professional competence in any of the areas that are significant to Robeson’s life from the beginning fated the book to failure. Furthermore, his stance as an ideological adversary of most of what Robeson stood for gives the book an adversarial, almost put down quality, rather than an objective and fair-minded investigation of this great man’s life, work and commitments He had done nothing in the areas of twentieth century African American history, labor history, African history, African American aesthetics, or the history of the Communist Party or the left. Duberman’s professional concern and competence had been with sexual history.[ see Radical History Review, Fall 1988] He , therefore, tailored this biography to what he knew and his principle interests. This may have been good for Duberman , but it obscures Robeson.
In dealing with the 1920′s-the height of the Garvey Movement and the Harlem Renaissance period–we learn little of Robeson’s relationships with that brilliant constellation of African American artist, writers, intellectuals and musicians that helped redefine the American intellectual and artistic landscape. Little or nothing is said of the philosopher Alaine Locke, poet Langston Hughes, anthropologist and novelist Zora Neale Hurston, poet Nicolas Guillen, Africanists and historians Leo and Oscar Hansberry, muscian/composer Louis Armstrong, dancer/choreographer Katherine Dunham, Josephine Baker and Bessie Smith. Although Duberman develops Robeson’s relationships with the revolutionary and socilaist poet Claude McKay and NAACP leader and intellectual Walter White, he presents Robeson primarily in the context of his relationships with white patrons of the Black arts movement, like the Van Vechtens and the Knopfs. Of Robeson’s contemporaries in the popular and jazz fields of the 1940′s, ’50′s and ’60′s, such as Lena Horne, Billy Holiday, Charlie Parker, Dizzy Gillesspi, Thelonius Monk and Billy Eckstine little or nothing is said. The sense is left that Robeson’s relationships with African Americans were superficial with few organic social, cultural and intellectual links among Robeson and leading African American thinkers.

Of Robeson’s early political associations Duberman’s scholarship is especially arid. William L. Patterson, the pioneering civil rights fighter and leader of the Communist Party, was an intimate political and intellectual associate of both Eslanda and Paul Robeson from the early 1920′s. However hardly anything of this relationship is developed. Patterson appears briefly in the beginning and is missing from the book until the 1950′s. Benjamin Davis Jr., the Morehouse and Harvard educated lawyer and leader of the Communist party, was considered by Eslanda and Paul among their dearest friends. Robeson once remarked that he would even have given his life for Ben Davis. Yet Duberman reduces Ben Davis to nothing more than a political water boy, consigned to communicating the “party line” to Robeson. W.E.B DuBois, a major intellectual figure of the twentieth century, considered Robeson like a son. DuBois and Robeson shared common intellectual, scholarly and political concerns, commitments and projects. Yet again this relationship is presented in a most superficial manner. Of Robeson’s relationship to the Garvey movement, the African Blood Brotherhood, the early African American socialists etc. nothing is said.

Duberman also fails to trace the roots of Robeson’s socialist ideas and working class partisanship. Historian and Robeson scholar Sterling Stuckey argues that Robeson’s contact with the British trade union movement was the occasion for his earliest systematic study of socialism and that from these contacts emerged Robeson’s life long commitment to the working class movement and socialism.
Concerning Robeson’s contacts with the London based African students movement Duberman scholarship is thin. Previous scholars have considered this a rich source for tracking Robeson’s early anti-colonial sentiments. It was here that he developed his deep and life long interest in African civilization. With respect to Robeson’s links to leaders of the African liberation movement like Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah Duberman’s scholarship is silent.

Duberman casts Robeson’s support for socialism and the Soviet Union in mainly subjective and emotional terms. The author suggests that Robeson was at times naive and blind concerning the Soviet Union. However Robeson scholars have suggested that he viewed socialism as the historical alternative in our epoch to colonialism, national and class oppression. Philip S. Foner and others point to his high regard for the Soviet people’s support to the anti-colonial and anti-fascist struggles. Robeson never forgot the boundless suffering of the Soviet people in the defeat of Nazism ; nor their enormous support to the Chinese revolution. In his own writings and speeches, and especially in Here I Stand, Robeson evidenced an understanding of the Soviet Union that was unalterably linked to history. Robeson, therefore, did not view the Soviet Union or its leadership as perfect or infallible. He, therefore, viewed socialist transformation in the Soviet Union as an entire epoch, rather than a single event. Duberman, wrongly contends, that Robeson adopted an expedient silence with respect to the disclosures of Stalin’s violations of socialist legality and norms, and the crimes that emerged therefrom. As with much else in the book Duberman presents no historically valid evidence for such a contention. Yet Duberman uses this contention as an ideological stick to beat the left generally and Robeson particularly. Duberman condemns Robeson for not distancing himself from the struggles for peace and socialism. Robeson biographer Lloyd Brown points out that Duberman goes as far as to use anti-Soviet and Zionist sources concerning his account of the situation of the Jewish poet Itzik Feffer. These sources had sympathy neither with Robeson, world peace or the Soviet Union. Duberman’s point is to paint Robeson as on the one hand dubbed by the Soviet Union and on the other as compromised on the Jewish question and human rights generally. Neither is the case. In fact the entire episode appears to be a total fabrication. [see Lloyd Brown, "Robeson, Scholarship and Slander: Response to Martin Duberman's Biography of Paul Robeson" in Jewish Affairs, April 1989]

Duberman presents the Communist party and individual communist in a perverse and distorted manner. The CP is portrayed as a dogmatic and rigid sect that after the 1940′s narrowed Robeson’s base and ultimately attempted to control him. Although Robeson did not hold this position and fervently rejected it, Duberman arrogantly puts it forth. Henry Winston is said to have urged Robeson during the height of the McCarthy period to “stick to singing.” The source for this is Paul Robeson Jr. No attempt is made to seek further corroboration. Besides distorting the character of Henry Winston, what is manifested is Duberman’s anti-communism. Duberman makes other unsubstantiated claims concerning Robeson’s relationship to the Communist Party. It is claimed that Robeson got along with the “centrist” Eugene Dennis, but was estranged from William Foster, Henry Winston and William Patterson. Once again the sole source is Paul Robeson Jr. and no other evidence is presented of what had to be complicated political and ideological relationships. At the same time Duberman reduces Paul Robeson’s ceaseless fight against anti-communism, McCarthyism and the Cold War to Robeson’s loyalties to his friends on the left. Are we to believe that Robeson was so politically naive? Were there not deeply held principles involved? Can Robeson’s politics be explained in a more complex way, which would suggest that Robeson was a major and mature political actor on the world stage? The point is that Robeson maintained a principled relationship with the leadership of the Communist Party. These relationships were maintained on the basis of mutuality and respect. The problems with the Communist Party are Duberman’s not Robeson’s. This while Robeson maintained a critical attitude to leaders and pollicies of the Party that he disagreed with; as was the case with leaders of the civil rights and labor movements. Rather than truthfully developing the historical record, Duberman attempts to work out his own biases, his politics and his problems in the context of a Robeson biography and make them appear to be Robeson’s. In this respect, Duberman continues the anti-Communist and racist attacks that Robeson endured throughout the Cold War.

Duberman presents what can only be considered a racist and sexist portrait of Eslanda Goode Robeson, Paul’s wife and comrade in arms of over forty years. She is portrayed as jealous, self-seeking, petty, haughty, as well as a financial and emotional drain upon Robeson. Her intellect, politics, courage and life-long collaboration with Robeson are rendered of no significance. Historian Gerald Horne describes Duberman’s treatment of Eslanda as “misogynist”. Duberman draws selectively from Eslanda’s extensive diaries and correspondence and presents an inaccurate and demeaning picture of Paul’s and Eslanda’s relationship. As far as Essie’s character and personality are concerned we hear little of substance from the Robeson’s closest friends and associates. We learn nothing of her politics and ideas and their contribution to Robeson’s thinking. Nothing of her collaborations with Pearl S. Buck, only passing mention of her anthropological studies in Africa . We learn nothing of her fight to free Ben Davis and other imprisoned communists, or of her joint effort with Claudia Jones in these campaigns.

In the last instance, the Duberman biography undermines the integrity of the historical record as it concerns Paul Robeson. In the Review of Radical History,[Fall 1988] Duberman candidly admits a lack of professional scholarly involvement with studies of Robeson prior to being chosen by Paul Robeson Jr. to do this biography. What then were Duberman’s motives? Clearly there are ideological ones. Duberman places his ideological positions against those of Robeson. In so doing he attempts to belittle Robeson’s politics. Secondly, Duberman reduces Robeson’s significance in history. Creating a fictionalized psychosexual history of Robeson does this. Thirdly, Duberman uses this biography to distort the history of the Communist Party and to continue a Cold War portrayal of the Soviet Union. Duberman leaves us with a tangle of inaccuracies and distortions. It is to be hoped that the Robeson estate now housed at the Moorland -Spingarn Research Center at Howard University, as well as the archives in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, will rapidly be made available to serious and committed scholars so that a rich and accurate scholarship worthy of Robeson can grow and be enriched by new generations of historians and social scientists.

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OBAMA AND THE CRISIS OF NEO-LIBERAL BLACK INTELLECTUALS

Charles Pete Banner-Haley’s book From Du Bois to Obama: African American Intellectuals in the Public Forum (2010) is a history of African American intellectuals from the standpoint of Barack Obama ‘s presidency. From his Obama post racial dream-world, Banner-Haley tells us, “African American intellectuals in the twenty-first century can take their cue from an Obama presidency and the words he spoke in Philadelphia during the race for the nomination. They can become ‘transformative black intelligentsia’ (123).” It should be obvious, the last thing black intellectuals need to do is “take their cue” from a pro-war, pro Wall Street, pro American imperialism presidency. Rather than fulfilling the legacy of W.E.B Du Bois (as the author claims) it is its opposite. Obama’s presidency represents a rupture with Du Bois and the progressive wing of black intellectuals. Obama’s Philadelphia speech was a neo-Booker T Washington compromise speech (equivalent to Washington’s Atlanta Compromise Address delivered in 1895). Obama decidedly argued that we had pretty much moved beyond racism’s most lethal forms. For him, while slavery was the nation’s ‘original sin’ racism left scars that damaged both whites and blacks. Hence, both his white grandmother and Reverend Jeremiah Wright represented the past of racial prejudice, stereotypes, fear, animus and anger. He positioned himself as representing the future of racial compromise and reconciliation. In neo-Booker T Washington style he urged black folk literally to “put your buckets down where you are”, instead of challenging white supremacy. The Obama presidency, in the end, seeks to fashion a racial compromise with conservatives, similar to Washington’s compromise with the Jim Crow South.

In Banner-Haley’s dreamscape, Obama’s election is both an end and a beginning. He insists, “Barack Hussein Obama in many ways was a culmination of the Civil rights movement and the starting point for African American intellectuals to confront those new definitions of race and identity (7).” The implication is “the new definitions of race and identity” are those that arise from an alleged post-racial America. African Americans, to cite Obama, have come 90% of the way to freedom. Obama, and by implication Banner-Haley, accept the neo-liberal position that the major problems confronting black folk are rooted in black culture, psychology and behaviors, especially of the poor. The author says Obama gravitated to Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson’s “synthetic analysis” that drew from both political liberalism and right wing conservatism. Wilson claims that since 1968 we have been in a period of the “declining significance of race”.

The book points to a new crisis of African American intellectuals. Cloistered in elite universities and increasingly leaning towards neo-liberal ideas on race, economics and politics, they are separated from black working people, the poor and the black middle class. While Obama, remains popular among African Americans as symbol of racial progress, his policies, that favor large banks, Wall Street and the military, places him and those black intellectuals who “take their cue” from him, at odds with the fundamental economic and social interests of the vast majority of African Americans. On the other hand, Obama’s insulting and practiced indifference to black suffering, his performance of post racialism, while savage racism engulfs him,his family, his presidency and all African Americans, his practice of keeping most blacks at arms length, yet on occasion inviting chosen Negroes to the White House, is nothing short of a put down of African Americans; behavior none of us would accept from a white President, Democrat or Republican.

Banner-Haley says, “Unable to make the connection either with the immiserated black poor or many of those newly arrived in the black middle class, black intellectuals found themselves visible, but encapsulated in an insulated academic world that may listen but often does not hear and does not act on the ideas, analyses, and prescriptions that these women and men present (45).” Because they are preoccupied with talking to white elites, they lack moral standing with black people. This is the price they pay to integrate white elite and capitalist circles. This, however, is only part of the problem. The larger part is that politically they are race neo-liberals. At the highest levels there is hardly a radical among them, unlike most in the past who were race radicals. The other problem is that they choose not to live among black people. They have separated themselves in their life styles, culture, and aspirations from the working class and poor in particular. Finally, they’re caught in the bind of trying to appear to serve opposing social and economic class constituencies. Elite universities demand that black intellectuals assume a post-racial sensibility and lifestyle; on the other hand, the black masses daily experience the most savage racism. Faced with this dilemma, neo-liberal black intellectuals become apologists for race and class oppression, while performing a not very convincing symbolic blackness.

Banner –Haley has it wrong, there is no trajectory from Du Bois to Obama. A more accurate description would be from Booker T Washington, and race compromise to Barack Obama and race neo-liberalism. Du Bois started his public intellectual career in 1897 founding, along with Alexander Crummell, Anna Julia Cooper and others, the American Negro Academy. In 1903 he publically presented his position on black leadership in the essay “The Talented Tenth”. He assumed that leadership would come from the educated. Reviewing talented tenth stance in 1948, he said, “I assumed that with knowledge sacrifice would automatically follow.” Rather, he insisted selfishness was a far greater impulse. He criticized himself for not realizing that most in a privileged group would tend to constitute themselves as an aristocracy, rather than a leadership connected to the masses and their uplift. In the year that he published in Talented Tenth essay he published The Souls of Black Folk. He made the famous prediction that the problem of the twentieth century would be the problem of the color line. What he meant was that liberal, or bourgeois democracy, could not advance, in fact would turn in upon itself, if the race issue went unresolved. While not being in the camp of liberalism, or of bourgeois democracy per se, he rightly understood that the obstacle to democracy for all excluded groups rested on resolving the race problem, especially the issue of black civil rights and the vote. But its resolution demanded the agency and activism of black folk, and black folk needed consistent and reliable leadership. At a time when Booker Washington was arguing that race and civil rights should be taken out of public and political discourse and that black leadership should take a back seat to white intellectuals, Du Bois argued the opposite. In 1948, he disappointedly concluded, most of the talented tenth abandoned its possible historic mission and became consumed in universal selfishness. He called for a new configuration of black leadership and black intellectuals. Rather than a talented tenth he called for a guiding one hundredth; a new leadership cadre drawn not only from the educated, certainly not from the ranks of those chosen “to lead Negroes” by white elites, but from the educated lower middle classes and the working masses. At this point he saw class origins and class loyalties as a critical determinant of black leadership.

With the Civil Rights and Black Power movements completed and civil rights legislation on the books, rather than a new racial democracy we witnessed a counter-revolution against black equality, rooted in preserving white racial privilege, branded as a new conservatism (Reaganism). Yet a small segment of blacks has progressed. A new talented tenth, which attempts to straddle the ideological divide between Booker T Washington and Du Bois. They claim Du Bois in words, but substantively are Bookerites.

Banner-Haley implies Du Bois ceased thinking after 1903, the year of The Souls of Black Folk. In truth, Du Bois became more radical the older he got. In the last quarter of his life he was a radical, anti-imperialist, socialist and communist. On this matter Martin Luther King Jr declared, ” We cannot talk of Dr Du Bois without recognizing 
 that he was a radical all of his life. Some people 
 would like to ignore the fact that he was a 
Communist in his later years.” Most scholars wish either to ignore this fact or claim that Du Bois had by the 1940’s lost his way and chosen “another path”.

The break by significant elements of the black elite with Du Bois started with the Cold War and McCarthyism. The US government labeled him “an agent of a foreign government ” for his pro-peace and anti-nuclear war stance. Many took solace in looking at the Du Bois of the early twentieth century, saying that his radicalism signified his separation from the struggle for black freedom. He was, they insisted, no longer a part of the civil rights movement, but of the far left. In the universities his name was seldom if ever mentioned. It was only with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, that it became permissible to mention his name and write books and article on him. Still his radicalism was viewed as that of a disappointed and isolated elder. His detractors explained his radicalism as the result of bitterness towards the talented tenth and not of his on going engagement with the realities of racism, war, colonialism and imperialism. Du Bois biographer David Levering Lewis, along with Cornel West and most recently Harvard professor Martin Kilson have looked on the last quarter of Du Bois’ life as a rupture with his “great period”, the period before 1945.

If we, as Dr King suggests, look at Du Bois’ life as a whole and view his latter years as part of an intellectual and scientific continuum of philosophical and practical development of the race question, his radicalism makes all the sense in the world. Elite African American intellectuals, most educated in white universities and who teach in these institutions, have made a break with Du Bois, while many, oddly enough, claim to be Du Boisian. American liberalism reached its high point in the 1930’s with the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. Since the 1980’s American democracy has become more right wing and more authoritarian and liberalism has become increasingly neo-liberal rationalizations of American empire. The banks, Wall Street and the military have undermined most avenues of democracy, including elections.

Black intellectuals in the second decade of the 21st century should not take a cue from Obama’s presidency, but from Du Bois. They should stop being afraid of Du Bois’ radicalism and anti-imperialism and end their cow towing to the conservatism of the white academic establishment. King, one of the greatest black intellectuals was right, “It is time to cease 
muting the fact that Dr. Du Bois was a genius and 
chose to be a Communist. Our obsessive 
 anti-communism has led us into too many 
 quagmires.”

Charles Pete Banner-Haley’s book is a political failure, but more, it distorts the truth and obscures the paths to developing a 21st century radical African American intelligentsia. Anchored in Obamism, and by implication neo-liberalism, Banner-Haley is blind to the real history of black intellectuals and of Du Bois. We do need a history of black intellectuals, (a project that professor Martin Kilson for some years has been working on) which is not an apologia for American capitalism and empire. We need 21st century intellectuals who are not afraid to reject neo-liberalism, who will speak the truth about the Obama Administration and race and US Empire, who are not fearful of criticizing free market capitalism, and indeed like Du Bois stand for a human future beyond capitalism. Black folk need a new radical intelligentsia in the Du Boisian tradition.

Posted in Black Intellectual, Political and Ideological Issues, BOOK REVIEWS, W.E.B DU BOIS AND HUMAN SCIENCE | 2 Comments

LOGIC. EMPIRICISM AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

Logic, as a “logic of investigation” [Popper] or a “logic of science” [Carnap] is, in the history of logic, a recent development. Prior to the emergence of the empirical sciences logic had been associated with Aristotlean syllogisms. However, the rise of mathematics and the physical sciences demanded that logic no longer be equated with simple or syllogistic proof. Bacon, Descartes and Leibniz undertook the earliest development of logic as a logic of investigation which had as its essential purpose the discovery of new truth. This would fulfill logic’s commitment to science. Bacon, considered by Marx the founder of English materialism and of “contemporary experimental science,” looked upon scientific truth as emerging from inductive logic. Descartes and Leibniz, on the other hand, looked upon logic as a branch of mathematics and therefore chose deductive logic as the method of discovering truth. Both Descartes and Bacon looked upon logic as a means of studying objects of nature and therefore as a means of discovering truth. The logical-mathematical method was viewed by Descartes as a means of solving scientific problems. Leibniz, like Descartes, expressed profound optimism concerning the possibilities of logic facilitating discoveries in new areas of research. Descartes’ objective, to construct a single mathematical system within the limits of deductive logic, was attempted in the early twentieth century by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica and by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. These efforts, though failing to establish a single deductive system to explain reality, or to as Russell suggested confirm “the appearance of the anticipated sense data,” did spur on later efforts of logical empiricism.

On the side of inductivism Bacon and later John Stuart Mill made robust claims. Mill asserted that every process leading to scientific knowledge could be represented as an inductive process. Such an assertion brought forward its opposite. The earliest criticism of Mill’s Logic was based upon its being solely bound to the sense content of phenomena and its failure to address properties, aspects, relations or structures of the object that is empirically given.

William Whewell, not unlike much that has followed, argued that empirical laws–meaning in Mill’s sense the causal connections of sense perception –could not lead to the discovery of new scientific laws. His view was that the discovery of new scientific laws introduced new scientific abstraction, which thereby serve to discover new connections between empirical data and thus form new theoretical systems. For Whewell this process of discovery is founded upon the process of applying a priori ideas to empirical material. He sought to discover new scientific laws through the introduction of new levels of abstraction. Whewell argued that empirical connections alone did not in and of themselves suffice to establish scientific discovery. For Whewell the new level of abstraction necessary was identified with a priori conditions of knowledge. It was here that new empirical connections could be discovered. The substance of Whewell’s argument, and that which remains valid in the rejection of old type inductivism, is the need to go beyond that which is given in sensation and the method of identifying sense data with the real. Mill’s inductivism was undermined by its inability to go beyond sense datum which placed radical limitations upon the possibilities of knowledge. It was therefore at variance with the advances being made in the natural sciences.

The unsatisfactory results of Mill’s Logic along with the enormous achievements in the natural sciences created the demand for new logico-methodological approaches to the questions of scientific knowledge. Moreover, the structure of scientific knowledge was increasing in complexity occasioning the use of mathematics to explain the unobservable. Ernest Mach and the empririo-critics suggested a new positivism that based its outlook upon Hume’s epistemology. [See Lenin, Materialism and Empririo Criticism, David Hillel Ruben.] Empririo criticism, while enjoying some popularity, failed to provide the necessary logical apparatus to address the pressing needs of science. Problems of logic were assuming a daily presence in the activity of science. Under these circumstances the logical, and more specifically the logico-methodological apparatus of theory, assumed a place of practical necessity in the unfolding of research. Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus sought to systematically address this situation. The formation of the Vienna Circle and the Society of Empirical Philosophy in Berlin attempted to construct upon the foundations of Principia and the Tractatus a consistent philosophy. They viewed past philosophy as a fetter to science. The objective then was to construct, based upon mathematics, a logical apparatus by which to determine the truth of the statements of science.

EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THE REDUCTIONIST PROGRAM OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

At the stage when the practical tasks of logic are to be found in the construction of the methodological apparatus of scientific knowledge that logical empiricism assumes centrality. What Suppe calls “The Received View” is an attempt to discover the “given” content of knowledge and the empirical significance of its elements. Logical empiricism, therefore, makes robust claims both from the standpoint of its negative and positive objectives. On the positive side it seeks a precise analysis of the cognitive significance of the concepts and statements of science in order to disclose their empirical or given content. Its negative function is to eliminate speculative philosophy from scientific discourse. This objective is best described as removing from statements of science all which is not reducible to that which is given in sensation. These objectives establish the reductionist and non-realist dimension of logical empiricism. Simply put, the logical empiricist program constitutes the reconstituting of the system of existing knowledge. Whereas for Bacon and Descartes the logic and methodology of science was directed to giving priority to searching for methods and techniques for discovering new knowledge, the logical empiricist seek to confirm existing knowledge.

Logical empiricism presents the primacy of empirical knowledge, what they have called the “directly given” based upon the reduction of knowledge to what is considered its primary empirical elements. Such a reduction ipso facto eliminates the possibility of levels of knowledge in the formation of knowledge, and literally collapses the theoretical into the empirical.

Logical empiricism has attempted various logical means of addressing the problem of levels of knowledge, while simultaneously maintaining their reductionist posture. For example, Russell proposed an extensional logic based upon the idea of nomological statements. Herein is reflected a change in the fundamental principles of methodology and logic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The roots of this change are to be found in the enormous complication of scientific knowledge and the development of the mathematical apparatus of science, the decline in the role of direct visualization or observation in scientific experimentation. The objective is to order and organize in a rigorous manner the exact meaning of scientific assertions and concepts. One would find it difficult to disagree with this objective if it is properly contextualized. However, to absolutize such an objective occurs at the expense of the creative and emergent characteristics of knowledge. Thus Russell and Whitehead’s Principia developed a mathematical logic that is extensional, the logic of truth functions. The truth value of each statement capable of being subdivided into component statements is determined unambiguously by the truth value of these components or, in other words, each component statement is a truth function of its components. If knowledge of reality requires reconstruction into a language whose grammar is extensional logic, the result of this reconstruction would be a set of statements interrelated by truth values. In order to rigorously define the “significance” of any statement, under this concept of logical structure, it is necessary to examine the connection of the given statement with other statements in terms of their truth values, that is to demonstrate of what statements the given statement is a truth function. It is, however, obvious that such a reductionist strategy cannot proceed endlessly. Such a system must contain ultimate statements, representing the limits of reducibility. Since the truth value of ultimate statements is not based upon the logical connection between them, they may only be postulated by some extra-logical means. It is at this point that purely logical procedures are of little value. The solution must be discovered at the level of epistemology. Thus the logical apparatus of the Principia finally rests upon certain epistemological and philosophical foundations. Russell rests upon an idealist, neo-Platonist epistemology, holding that sense perception is the ultimate source of experience. [See Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 363.] For Russell all knowledge is reducible to a set of atomic statements or assertions, which are empirically verifiable by sense perception. Therefore, for logical atomism, all knowledge is a set of statements about sense data and the cognitive meaning of the set of fundamental statements is revealed in the last analysis through the empirical sense-perceived conditions of truth. Therefore, to understand an assertion or statement consists in knowing its empirical conditions, the sense datum which verifies them. Russell formulated this relation thusly, “Verification always consists in the appearance of the anticipated sense-data.” Schlick used the phrase “The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification.” Obviously, the verification principle of logical atomism relies upon observation or sensation. But what of non-observable statements? Wittgenstein’s answer in the Tractatus held that logical and mathematical propositions do not constitute knowledge of reality, they are contentless and empty. They are basically guidelines indicating the permissible transformations of modes of linguistic expressions, but in no way bear upon their meaning. Logical propositions are tautologies which are true under any and all combinations. Such tautologies convey no knowledge of the actual world or bring forth no new information [see Suppe on the Received View]. Carnap later on took up this same view. [The Logical Structure of the World.] According to this view the world assumes the structure of mathematical logic and therefore proposes that the world is in a one to one correspondence with logic. [Russell, The Structure of the External World.]

The Theory of Correspondence

This unique theory of correspondence brings together the reductionist and anti-realist positions of logical empiricism. While later rejecting the earlier atomist ontology [Suppe, p. 67] it sacrificed nothing in terms of its logic and methodology. It merely separated analytical and synthetic truths [Suppe, p. 67]. Hindess goes so far as to suggest that neo-positivism treats all ontology as strictly meaningless [p. 239] Carnap as well argues in this direction [Schlick, 1963, p. 868] this constituted an abandonment of ontology by Carnap and the Vienna Circle. This constituted a solipsistic turn, and as V. S. Shvyrev suggests, the universalization of formal logic and the effort to build a theory of knowledge resting exclusively upon concepts of formal logic. Shvyrev finally makes the following point: “. . . abandonment of ontological presuppositions such as the theory which constitutes reality as a set of atomic facts does not in any way influence the essence of epistemological logic. . . . Therefore, by disregarding the pluralist ontology of logical atomism, the neopositivists of the Vienna Circle were able to borrow the fundamental characteristics of the conception of the epistemological logic of Russell and Wittgenstein: the view of knowledge as a system of extensionally related statements, the understanding of the truth of ultimate statements as empirical truth, and the fundamental opposition presumed to exist between the logical character of the propositions of both logic and mathematics on the one side, considered as procedures for symbolic transformations, and, on the other side, the propositions of the rest of science considered as empirical knowledge of reality” [pp. 15-16]. Thus the problem now becomes that of cognitive significance of statements. Statements therefore, either have formal meaning–i.e. synthetic significance, or empirical meaning–i.e., analytic significance. Finally, logic and mathematics and later semantics are contrasted to all other sciences as a formal science.

However, the problems of observation and empirical significance are seen as problems of the relations of logical knowledge to sensory knowledge–of tautological statements to sense datum [quote Carnap and Schllip].

Assertions containing empirical conditions of truth are contrasted to those which contain formal meaning. This synthetic-analytic distinction first appeared in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [Suppe]. This distinction can be characterized as the observation-theoretical distinction. It is crucial to logical empiricism’s attempt at carrying out a logical analysis of knowledge directed at disclosing its empirical significance. Shvyrev suggests that logical empiricism’s concept of empirical significance reduces the logical and in particular the intellectual content of knowledge to sensory knowledge, to the expression of given sensations in speech, thereby depriving thought of its distinctive quality as the highest stage of reflection [p. 16]. Suppe [p. 80] draws attention to the untenability of the observation-theoretical distinction as developed by logical empiricism. Using the findings of Putnam-Achinstein Suppe argues that logical empiricism onesidedly develops the distinction. Moreover, he argues that logical empiricism artificially presents the distinction.

Underlying the concept of empirical significance is the conclusion that the cognitive meaning of an assertion about the world consists of the expression of an immediate site of things. Joergensen quotes Carnap as saying, “The meaning of a statement consists in its expressing a (thinkable, not necessarily also an actual) state of affairs. If an alleged statement expressed no (thinkable) state of affairs, it has not meaning and hence is only apparently an assertion. If a statement expresses a state of affairs, it is at all events meaningful, and it is true if that state of affairs exists and false if it does not.” [p. 29] The point is that for a statement to be factual it must be grounded upon experience. For Carnap the use of logistical concepts allows for the statements of various sciences being transformed into statements about immediate experiences having the same truth-values as original statements. Therefore, all scientific statements are capable of being verified or falsified by means of immediate experience. This method of achieving empirical significance came to be known as the principle of verification. For logical empiricism in general the meaningfulness of reality-sentences is connected to their verifiability.

The question of how to verify reality sentences is of utmost importance. Popper establishes falsification as the criterion of the meaningfulness of statements. Using this criterion of meaning Popper proposed to sort out empirical-scientific sentences from a priori analytical sentences (logical and mathematical) as well as from nonfalsifiable reality sentences (metaphysics). Popper is, therefore, suggesting rather than an absolute concept one that argues for “degrees of testability (Prufbarkeit)” (Joergensen, p. 73). Empirical testability is identified not with verification, but with falsification–i.e., the possibility of empirical refutation of statements. The principle of falsifiability is regarded by Popper as the “criterias of demarcation,” the distinction between scientific empirical knowledge of the world and “metaphysical systems” [V. S. Shvyrev, p. 21). Carnap in the essay "Testability and Meaning" (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3] argues that truth and confirmation must be distinguished. Truth he says is an absolute concept, independent of time, confirmation, on the other hand, is a relative concept, the degree of which varies with the development of science. Carnap differentiates directly testable reality-sentences from those that are indirectly testable. Directly testable reality sentences are those based directly upon observation. Indirectly testable reality sentences consists in directly testing other sentences that have certain relationships to it. Concerning verification and confirmation and thus the basis of establishing empirical significance Carnap says,

If by verification is meant a definitive and final establishment of truth, then no (synthetic) sentence is ever verifiable, as we shall see. We can only confirm a sentence more and more. Therefore, we shall speak of the problem of confirmation rather than of the problem of verification.

Carnap, finally, proposer that logic, rather than a fact for verification is directed to confirming sentences. As such, as with further developments in analytic philosophy, logic and methodology are primarily tools for formalizing given knowledge.

With this overview I will proceed to the works of Mill, Russell and Carnap.

Mill’s Logic, Scientific Inquiry and Deduction
In his System of Logic Mill sought to separate the empirical foundations of natural science from Humean causality. As such, he wished to demonstrate that the philosophy of experience could be the epistemological foundation of scientific inquiry. Although his epistemology remained bound to the sense content of phenomena and remained traditional and empiricist, his logical approach was innovative. His Logic is essentially a discussion of inferential knowledge and the rules of inference. His final object was to establish the superiority of inductive reasoning. As far as deduction is concerned he held it could never be the source of new knowledge. Mill equated deductive reasoning with its most common syllogistic form and argued that the syllogism cannot contain more than is in its premises. As he posited, “no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything since from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as known.” However, Mill defends deduction on the limited grounds that deductive and inductive reasoning proceeds “from particulars to paraticulars.” Syllogistic reasoning proceeds, “All men are mortal; Jones (not yet dead) is a man; therefore, Jones is mortal.” Our evidence that Jones wil die and therefore is mortal (a particular truth) is based upon our evidence that Smith, Johnson, Harris have died and others who in significant ways are like Jones have died. We, therefore, infer from thier deaths to his. We infer from one set of particulars to another. Finally, it is experiential evidence upon which prediction rest. Experience is the real foundation of inference. Deduction is a manner of interpreting our initial inference. The value of deduction rests, therefore, upon its capacity to prevent misinterpretation. However, no new information is brought forward. Syllogisms merely recover from general statements particular ones that were previously assumed. Deductive or syllogistic reasoning is tautological. Mill refers to deductive inference as apparent inference. The propositions that arise from deductive logic are called verbal propositions.

Induction, on the other hand, is that method of logic which gives non-verbal general proposition that go beyond apparent observation. Real inference comes only from induction.

Inductive Reasoning and Scientific Explanation in Mill’s Logic

Induction is for Mill the source of substantive general propositions. He uses the term induction in two ways: (a) as inference and (b) as investigation. Mill is here proceeding in a Baconian manner. He held that the cannons of the experimental method have the same function for induction as the cannons of syllogisms have for deduction. [O. A. Kubitz: 39] Mill’s definition of induction is classic and significant. Of induction he states: it is

the operation of discovering and proving general propositions. It is true that . . . the process of indirectly ascertaining individual facts is truly inductive and that by which we establish general truths . . . But it is not a different kind of induction; it is a form of the very same process: since on the one hand, generals are but collections of particulars, definite in kind but indefinite in number; and on the other hand, whenever the evidence which we derive from observation of known cases justifies us in drawing inference respecting even one unkown case, we should on the same evidence be justified in drawing a similar inference with respect to a whole class of cases. The inference either does not hold at all, or it holds in all cases of a certain description, in all cases which in certain respects resemble those we have observed. [Logic: 208]

Herein we discover Mill’s dual usage of induction. The first is the collection of facts–here MIll is wedded to the Baconian experimental method. Secondly, induction is used to infer from particular observation. [Kubitz: 144]

Causality in Mill’s System

Mill, in order to propose the possibility of inference from particulars to general truths, assume dregularity and constancy in nature. Such an assumption is rooted in Newtonian mechanics. Newton argued that the movement of solid particles occurs in an absolute spatial and temporal framework. Their movements, moreover, are governed by immutable laws. The method of finding these laws was characterized by Newton as a process of analysis and synthesis. Analysis included the experimental operations; synthesis the mathematical and deductive operations Mill, however, gave primary to the analytic or experimental. For Mill it is evident that the “uniformity of the course of nature is . . . itself a complex fact, compounded of all the separate uniformities which exist in respect to single phenomena.” [Kubitz: 48, quoted from Mill's Definition of Political Economy] Mill says of this method,

“the method of the practical philosopher consists . . . of two processes; the one analytical, the other synthetical. He msut analyze the existing state of society into its elements, not dropping or losing nay of them by the way. After referring to experience of individual man to learn the law of each of these elements, that is to learn what are its natural effects, and how much of the effect follows from so much of the cause when not counteracted by any other cause there remains an operation of synthesis; to put all these effects together, and from what they are separately, to collect what would be the effect of all the causes acting at once. [Early Essays: 152-153]

General laws are general regularities emerging from the synthesis of particular regularities. As he states in the Logic, “what happens once, will under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again.” [quoted from Nagel: 317] The assumption of constancy in nature makes this possible. Thus an effect has a constant cause given constancy of circumstance. Thus Mill argues, causality is an “unconditional invariable antecedent” [Logic: 326] Inductive logic has as its principle purpose to discover nature’s regularities–i.e., the “unconditional invariable antecedents.” Mill suggests that the problem of induction is to discover, “the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being granted, the whole existing order of nature would result.” This search for atomic truths, as it werre, will be rediscovered by Russell. Mill places this matter in the follwoing words, “What are the fewest general propositions from which all the uniformities which exist in the universe might be deductively inferred?” [Logic: 317] Mill locked upon this as a long process which occurs over generations.

Newtonian Macrophysics and Millsean Causality

It is helpful, I believe, in understanding Mill’s concept of causality to look at the basic assumptions of Newtonian Macro-physics. Professor Horz and his colleagues have written on Newtonian causality. If the state of a physical system, i.e., the position coordinates and momenta, and the forces affecting it are known with absolute precision at a given moment of time, the state of the system at any other time can be predicted with absolute accuracy. Characteristic of this classical-mechanical form of causality is the assumption of precise predictability.

According to this and the Millsean conceptualization law and causality are identical. Its power rests with its mathematical elegance and systematic construction which is based upon experimentally verified knoweldge and fully tested in practice [Horz]. Mill’s assumption that law-likeness or regularity in nature reflect invariance and precision are rooted in Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, Kubitz suggests that Mill’s understanding of analysis and synthesis was similar to Newton’s. According to Kubitz Newton and Mill adopted Stewart’s position on analysis and synthesis. Stewardt reversed the Greek foundation holding that the mathematical or geometric was distinct from that of the physicist. Mathematics begins from hypothetical assumptions and the object is to arrive at a known truth or datum by reasoning synthetically–a path that allows us to later on retrace our steps. The synthetic process is obtained by reversing the analytic process. Since both processes have in view the demonstration of the same theorem or the solution of the same problem, theyt form in reality different parts of one and the same investigations. [Kubitz: 173] Stewart states the problem in the follwoing manner,

Our analysis necessarily sets out from known facts, and after it has conducted us to a general principle, the synthetical reasoning which follows consists always of an application of this principle to phenomena, different fromm those comprehended in the original induction. [quoted in Kubitz: 263]

Both Newton and Mill appear to have adopted this process. Analysis is to be understood as the experimental and observational stage, while the formalization of the results into law is considered the synthetic stage. The discovery of cause results from the formalization of observation and experiment.

NOTES
* Hilary Putnam poses the question in the manner which asks, “How does the mind access the world.” Putnam, rather than transcendental idealism, argues for what he calls the method of internal realism, where concepts are intrinsically connected to the objects of reality. As he puts things, “‘Objects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the objects and the signs are alike internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what.” [p. 52] Putnam, therefore, suggests a transcendental connection which seeks to deny the correspondence theory of truth while upholding the necessity of sense datum being connected to a conceptual scheme. Putnam goes beyond Whewell, precisely by expanding the definition of what is real. The real becomes as well the conceptual.

* This process, under different circumstances and with different objectives, continued with logical empiricism, which declared the principle objective of logic to be the verification and later the confirmation of existing knowledge. Whewell did, however, address a principle weakness of Mill’s inductivism–i.e., its reductionism–while leaving unsettled the question of realism, an epistemological question which awaited the post positivist era to be addressed.

* Bhaskar p. 36 argues that neo-positivism holds that statements about being can be reduced to statements about knowledge, or putting it another way, ontological questions can be transposed into epistemological ones. Bhaskar calls this the epistemic fallacy.

* Popper felt that the initial statement of logical empiricism had complicated matters and that “logical positivism destroys, not only metaphysics, but also natural science. To correct the problem Popper proposed rather than verification, the method of falsification.
* See the contemporary efforts in mathematical logic, chaos theory, far from equilibrium dynamics and rational choice theory.

* Mill’s position on induction and deduction was demonstrated through mathematics. Geometry was considered by him to be based on deductive logic. Mill argued that the conclusions of geometry are based on premises grounded in observation and generalization from these observations. Engels, interestingly, arrived at a similar conclusion.

* This method of dealing with problem of analysis and synthesis reappears in logical empiricism, particularly the work of Carnap and in analytic Marxism, but in the more sophisticated form of the relationship between empirical and theoretical knowledge.

REFERENCES
Bhaskar, R.A., 1997 [1975], A Realist Theory of Science, London: Verso
Hörz, Herbert Philosophical Problems in Physical Science (1980). Minneapolis. Marxist Education Press.
Kubitz, O. A. The Development of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic. (1932).Illinois studies in the social sciences
Mill, John Stuart. (1909) System of Logic. New York. Harper and Brothers
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere (1986), Oxford University Press
Putnam, Hilary, Reason, Truth and History, (1980), London, Cambridge University Press
V. S. Shvyrev, “Some Problems in the Logico-Methodological Analysis of the Relation Between the Theoretical and Empirical Levels of Scientific Cognition,,Soviet studies in philosophy, Volume 8

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Race and Empire: W. E. B. Du Bois and the US State

THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 did not begin the transformation of the US state. They accelerated processes that had for almost three decades been taking shape, transforming the US state and political system towards an authoritarian right-wing democracy (see Chalmers Johnson,Nemis: The Last Days of the Republic, 2008). In this respect, the US state, which from its inception has been racialized, is today more racist, more imperialist and more geared to global war than ever in its history. This reconfiguration of the US state establishes the hegemony of its military industrial/national security and police/domestic control sectors, over what might be consider its New Deal, social welfare and non-military and non-domestic control sectors. The New Deal and Welfare State dimensions of the state (those dimensions associated with the radical bourgeois reforms brought about in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements of the 1960s) are being downsized, privatized or eliminated. The largest agencies of the US government are today the Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security. To cite no less an authority than Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State and a former US Ambassador to the United Nations, and currently the Obama Administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,”the American military has acquired an unprecedented role in the conduct of foreign policy”( n1) This is accounted for by the exigencies of the global warfare and empire building policies of the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations, but also by the logic inherent to neo-liberal globalist economic policies. The US and Wall Street generated financial crisis and Great Recession have not lessened or forced a rethinking of either the military’s role in foreign policy, empire or neo-liberal globalization (see Chalmers Johnson’s recent book Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope, 2010). Vast and radical attacks upon bourgeois democracy, civil liberties and human rights are under way in the United States, allegedly justified by the need for homeland security. This is accompanied by a rise of poverty, unemployment, hunger, imprisonment and disease, especially among African Americans and other racially oppressed groups.

W.E.B Du Bois, Race, and the World System
IN ESSENTIAL WAYS, W.E.B. Du Bois in his major works provides necessary elements of a state theory, a theory of the world system and of crisis. Du Bois’s work carries an overarching political meaning in the current historical context. The Souls of Black Folk, for instance, was designed to address the political task of the African American struggle and the struggle for bourgeois democracy at the start of the twentieth century. Besides many of the philosophical, historical and sociological significances of the text, its contemporary relevance is in the manner it addresses the struggle for democracy and bourgeois liberties under conditions of racialized state power. Even in his conceptualization of bourgeois democratic reforms Du Bois superseded both progressivism and socialism. Each were blind to the centrality of race and white supremacy as core dynamics of reaction and conservatism; but more, neither saw the state in racialized terms. And while each of these reform movements foresaw a crucial role for the state in bringing about reform in the political and economic systems, neither understood race as the critical foundation of the US state.
Scholars such as David Levering Lewis (1993) and Alex Schafer (2001) suggest that Du Bois was highly influenced by the normative and reform orientation of his professors in Berlin, in particular Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, both leading figures in the school of historical economics. Du Bois was a graduate student in Germany between 1892 and 1894.( n2) The German historical school of economics assumed a major role for the state in the organization of a just and democratic society; this in stark contrast to the laissez-faire economics of the Anglo-American school. In defining the problem of the twentieth century as the color line and the struggle against it, he was anticipating both the civil rights and anti-colonial struggles, albeit in their bourgeois democratic dimensions. However, Du Bois was mindful in Souls of the ruin of bourgeois democratic political and economic relationships in the US after the long period of chattel slavery, the Civil War and the overturning of Reconstruction. And thus he viewed the onslaught against democracy as rooted in the racist overturning of Reconstruction and the forcing of the former slaves back towards slavery.
THE COURTS, he would argue, had become a universal device for the reenslavement of blacks. The second chapter of Souls “Of the Dawn of Freedom” creates a paradigm which suggests that Reconstruction’s great benefit was its demonstrating, often in limited ways, the possibility of arranging bourgeois democratic political and economic relationships upon non-racist foundations. The failure of Reconstruction, therefore, made it inevitable (a point that would be fully developed in Black Reconstruction) that the problem for democracy in the twentieth century would be the problem of the color line; or more precisely the problem of race and race relationships. The irrefutable assumption of the enterprise in Souls is that the overturning of Reconstruction inaugurated a new stage of the racialized US state and a racialized (or herrenvolk) democracy. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) enshrined these relationships as constitutional and thus protected by law. Du Bois conceived of this problem as a global problem, which he would over the course of his studies conceptualize as a world crisis for democracy.
RACE was seen as both the unfinished business of the US nation and the ultimate test of its creed. By the time of the writing of Black Reconstruction (1935) it is apparent that, for Du Bois, nothing short of revolutionary struggle would bring about the realization of democracy for black folk, especially the black proletariat. A decade later in Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace (1945) the world system implications of the struggle for democracy are asserted. The world system, he argues, is profoundly anti-democratic, dictatorial and organized upon principles not that far removed from fascism.( n3) The white nations of Europe and America defend a world system that locks the majority of humanity in a perpetual crisis state, defined by poverty, disease, little or no education and super-exploitation; which at the same time supports luxury for the world’s white minority.
The political and moral agency of democracy, in the end, insists Du Bois, is not to be found in the “Western democracies” but among the colonized and oppressed throughout the world. And, finally, the crisis of the world system would be resolved through the anti-colonial struggle, economic liberation and the rearranging of the world’s political and economic relations upon antiracist, anti-imperialist, socialist and democratic principles (see Black Reconstruction, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace, The World and Africa, The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois).( n4) This process, in the long view, would constitute a fundamental change of epochs from white supremacy and colonial imperialism to global democracy.
MOST SCHOLARSHIP has understood the word problem in the sentence, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line” conventionally. The word problem has been interpreted to mean just that, a problem. I would suggest that the word problem in the Du Boisian oeuvre means crisis. In his work “The African Roots of the War” (1915), what Du Bois is clearly addressing are the crises in the world system brought about by the intensification of discrimination along the color line and colonialism, a crisis that led to the First World War. The problem, therefore, of US and world relationships, rooted in the “problem of the twentieth century” must be understood as a crisis which leads to war, repression and fascism. At the core of the problem of race relationships are the crises these relationships produce.
The color line as an explanatory category goes a considerable distance in explaining social, political, cultural, technological and other relationships and events that configure the world system. Race, the color line and race relationships are the context of the world system, At the same time, the world system is a set of concrete mechanisms through which the color line is actuated; the color line configures the relationships of the darker to the lighter races of humanity. Put another way, it configures the relationships of humanity to itself. Du Bois’s “The African Roots of the War” (1915), Black Reconstruction (1935), Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace (1945) and The World and Africa (1947) are studies of crises in the US and world systems. The resolution of the crisis of race is central to resolving the crisis of the modern world system in Du Boisian logic. For Du Bois this requires more than a change in the nature of economic relationships, as it were, from capitalism to socialism. That change could be the start of a deeper attack upon the color line and thus a fundamental stage in resolving the crisis of human relationships and of the world system. If not, a change of modes of production might constitute a new way to arrange the world system and thus race relationships, rather than overthrowing the regime of white supremacy. This logic insists both upon the centrality of Africa and Asia and the anti-colonial struggle in remaking the world system; and rejects an economistic explanation that privileges economic relationships in measuring fundamental change.( n5)
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR and the global crisis created by the conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems, Du Bois argued that race and the colonization and neo-colonization of Africa and Asia are foundational to the world systems crisis. In this respect, Du Bois argues that the test of socialism as an alternative economic system to capitalism is its relationship to Africa–whether the leaders of socialism would deal with Africa upon anti-racist and democratic principles–or seek to rearrange the world system in such ways as to benefit from the oppression and neo-colonization of Africa. Would socialism promise to its working people a lifestyle similar to that of white people in the West? Would it as a system be over-determined by efforts to resolve internal political contradictions through organizing its social relationships upon consumerist, individualist and ultimately white supremacist principles? Would the ideal be a socialism of luxury? A socialism at odds with humanity’s non-white majority? In the end, the failure of European socialism is its failure to resolve the problem of white supremacy within its societies and to join humanity’s non-white majority in a consistent, indeed, revolutionary, struggle to alter the world system itself in such ways as to occasion a global redistribution of wealth based upon world democracy. This framework informs my understanding of US imperialism at the current stage and helps explain contemporary events.

The New Imperialism
PHILIP BOBBITT (2004), a defender of American imperialism, writes that George W. Bush is “the authentic voice of the liberal imperialist.” An imperialist who, according to Bobbitt, is concerned with a world of prosperity, women’s and minority rights, secularization and democracy. These policies, he insists, “take the doctrine of ‘democratic engagement’ of the first Bush administration, and the doctrine of ‘democratic enlargement’ of the Clinton administration, one step further. It might be called democratic transformation’. Or, it might be called ‘liberal imperialism.’” And then, he asks, “What is wrong with this noble idea?” This article will, in part, attempt to suggest “what is wrong with this noble idea.”
The current moment of empire and the new relationship of forces within the United States are crystallized in the Bush Administration’s Doctrine of Preemptive War,( n6) the USA Patriot Act, and the Homeland Security Act. The Justice Department and the Homeland Security Department are designed as the command centers of the attack upon civil and political rights. International law and international institutions, at the same time, are under assaulted as the Bush Administration declares its right to wage war unilaterally anywhere in the world. The Administration has literally declared itself outside of the bounds of international law and thus according to its own definitions, a rogue state. In economic terms, a policy shift from Keynesian state economic and financial planning to a neo-liberal Friedmanite free market, has been institutionalized.
THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, modern capitalism, bourgeois democracy, globalization and contemporary pop culture are virtually incomprehensible without understanding the modern racialized capitalist state. Nor can the new imperialism be understood without understanding its historical anchorage in the racialized US state. While these are issues that engage state and political theory they are also matters that must be investigated historically. The social psychological and ideological dimensions are particularly important. It is safe to say that the American population, particularly white people, views the current moment as a new and unsafe frontier. There is a perceptible transformation of the psychological and ideological impulses among white Americans and something that resembles a collective traumatization is occurring as the business of empire comes home to roost.
The psychological and ideological moment is nourished by the concerns that ordinary white people have with their own vulnerability and their awareness that it is they who are called upon to make significant sacrifices in the name of empire. It is in this milieu that we witness the attempt of leading elements of the state to forge a national identity and sense of purpose geared to fit this new moment. Indeed, the conscious and subconscious dimensions of the American belief system are historically constituted. On the one hand they are variants of extreme individualism; but, at the same time, they embrace notions of whiteness and white supremacy that acknowledge the contingency of the individual upon the larger group. This dialectic between the white race and white supremacy on the one hand, and individualism on the other, accounts for certain of the contradictions of action and thought among white folk. This is particularly pronounced as regards economic and class interests.
In the priority hierarchy of most white people class and economic interests are of secondary or tertiary significance in the determination of political behavior; race trumps class in defining consciousness and political behavior.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL and ideological realities of ordinary white folk are filtered through the prisms of race, nationalism and white supremacy. The perceived threats, therefore, are viewed as threats to white people as a collective and not solely to the economic interests of the nation, or even to specific class interests. For them the American dreamscape has been sullied and tarnished. Their sense of security and the expectation of privacy are wounded. In their minds, their dream world has to be redeemed in order that the American psyche be restored. In the deepest sense the privileges of whiteness and white supremacy are perceived as being under attack. Hence, the defense of America and of democracy is at the core a defense of the global rights of white people, articulated variously as defenses of civilization or the West.
What we have is the reassertion of the notion of civilized and uncivilized nations. Civilized nations are either Western or those whose elites adhere to or adopt Western civilizational values. Hence, the war against terrorism is to uphold Western civilization. However, once it is connected to its objective, an American global empire, it may be properly viewed as a war to universalize white supremacy and to establish the United States as its hegemon. This inevitably leads to tearing up of the international legal framework established since 1945; in particular, the UN Charter and its commitments to decolonization and universally recognized human rights. This constitutes a profound emasculation of international law and a return to the Great Nations system of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As is clear this system harkens back to the time of rampant colonization. Clusters of right-wing commentators are either calling for the US to leave the UN or to severely minimizes its participation. Others more boldly assert the need to for an alternative international organization called the League of Democracies, which would divide the world between the so-called civilized nations and the less than civilized or uncivilized nations.

The US State’s Evolutionary History
THE GENERAL HISTORICAL TREND is for the United States to move to the right in terms of foreign and domestic policies. This inexorable movement, with temporary moments of slow down in the 1930s and 1940s, and the 1960s, has reached an extremely dangerous moment. The overturning of Reconstruction inaugurated this movement.( n7) Race and white supremacy in the post-slavery history of the US have so shaped the nature of class and social relationships and thus of consciousness that the most significant trend among white folk is to the right and conservatism. Hence, support for most state policies of war and racism.
There is yet another way to understand state policy, which is as a manifestation of a growing crisis of the global economic system. World systems theorists as varied as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, W.E.B. Du Bois, Immanuel Wallerstien, Samir Amin and Andre Gunther Frank have argued that the world system has been in crisis since the beginning of the twentieth century. According to world systems theorists, this has produced war, economic depressions and revolution. This idea of a crisis of the global system is periodized in two ways: one, from the standpoint of economic and business cycles and secondly from the standpoint of large socio-political phenomena, such as wars, national liberation struggles and revolutions. However, both types of phenomena tend to overlap in history and can be viewed as part of the multiple determinations of historical reality. Certainly, a plausible case can be made for the argument that the Bush strategy of war and empire fits a moment of economic crisis and the challenges to US hegemony by forces as disparate as China’s industrial development, India’s technological challenge and the antiauthoritarian movements in the Middle East. Commentators such as Chalmers Johnson (2004) are explicit in arguing that the Bush doctrine represents an effort to resolve profound problems in the global system.
WHITENESS is a dynamic and crucial factor of state formation. Traditional Marxian state theory understands state formation in the US as determined by class conflict. Hence, the class of slave owners, bankers, merchants and small capitalists seized state power in the American Revolution in the name of democracy and the American nation. In this construal the American Revolution was a bourgeois democratic revolution. Du Boisian historiography asserts that a racialized class, made up of slaveholders, merchants, bankers, small farmers and workers (see Suppression of the African Slave Trade (1896), Black Reconstruction (1935) seized power and deployed it to maintain the main form of property–slaves–as the basis for national economic development and white privilege.
It is significant that Du Bois defines the slaves in Suppression as workers and in Black Reconstruction as a proletariat. Here rests his visionary reconceptualization of the class struggle and revolutionary agency. Indeed, it is the industrial working class or the proletariat as suggested by Marx that constitutes the revolutionary agency of modernity. However, Du Bois will initiate an act of profound theoretical displacement in Suppression and most decisively in Black Reconstruction, arguing that the former slaves are the racialized proletariat of America, and the principal agency of progressive and revolutionary change.
EVEN IN THE EARLY PERIODS of American history, in relationship to the slaves the white proletariat and petty bourgeoisie constituted a nascent labor aristocracy, which defines its social being in opposition to the black proletariat (see David Roediger, Wages for Whiteness, 2007; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White, 1995). Therefore, the dominance of slaves as the main form of property and the principle source for the production of wealth, gave a racialized definition and identity to the slaves, and to the classes that make up white people. In fact, the racialized dimension of these identities is overdetermining of other social relationships. To use Marxist language, the bourgeoisie in the American context (as well as in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) is first white. The working classes are, therefore, racially identified. All classes and strata of white people become identified as a separate race-class from blacks and therefore defined the nation and the state in racialized terms.( n8) A racialized nation-state is formed; and within this mixture, the core, or organizing mechanism of race, class, nation and nationality is the racialized state. The slaves constituted in Du Bois’s thinking the principal proletarian agency in nineteenth-century US history. The racialized self-identification of white workers and what Du Bois called “a wage for whiteness” bound them more strongly to the white bourgeoisie than to the black proletariat.( n9) This wage for whiteness is, so to speak, an ontological benefit to being identified as white. Hence, an ontological identification exists between white workers and white slave owners, white workers and white capitalist, etc.
The state, therefore, is not a mechanism of class rule, sui generis, it is a mechanism of race-class rule. It is legally constituted not merely as an instrument of governance and rule by a class of property owners, but of the dominant race-class. This rule is organized upon the ideology of white supremacy. Hence, the boundaries between the ruled and the rulers along class lines are blurred and fluid, while the real and most enduring boundaries are between the racially dominant and racially subordinated groups. Furthermore, as Du Bois suggests, from the racially oppressed emerges the proletariat and within it resides the vast reservoir of proletarian consciousness and agency (see Black Reconstruction, chapter 4 “The General Strike”). The “class struggle” in this Du Boisian construal is organized around the struggle against white supremacy and its central organizing principal is the struggle for black freedom. The racialized state functions as the instrument of white unity and white ideological identity against the threat of the black race-class and its proletariat core.
DU BOIS’S CONCEPTUALIZATION of the US state as a racialized instrument does not negate the Marxist theory of the state. His theory advances Marxism, realizing a new theoretical synthesis which is both theoretically and empirically more accurate. The Du Boisian construal is both theoretically elegant and highly predictive. Which is to say it fits the actual history of the US and is able to not merely describe the history of the racialized state, but anticipate its trajectories. Furthermore, it breaks out of the reductionist strategies of class essentialism and methodological individualists. It is the least dogmatic of the major theories of the state.
This Du Boisian standpoint informs a growing body of scholarship. A significant reexamination of state theory and its legal implication is occurring. Some of this is associated with the school of scholarship called critical race theory and thinkers such as Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams, Cheryl Harris, Kimberlé Crenshaw and Charles Mills. Along side this school is the school identified as whiteness studies, whose proponents are David Roediger, Noel Ignatiev, Theodore Allen and Joe Feagin among others. Thinkers like Bernard Magubane and Clarence J. Munford have thought deeply about the state using traditional Marxism as a starting point, but going beyond it in a Du Boisian manner. Their line of research and reasoning represents the most fruitful to understanding the racialized state.
Charles Mills argues that the US state is formed out of a racial contract between white folk. The state is an a priori condition of modern racialized societies. Bernard Magubane shows a similar process with respect to South African state formation. Magubane’s studies examines a white settler colony and the modalities of state formation that emerged from the conflicts and cooperation between English and Dutch settlers to control the African majority of South Africa.
THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT of the US state emphasizes that it was formed and legitimated by white people based upon a protracted history of compromise, conflict, civil war and armed struggle among themselves, accompanied by a long, brutal history of betrayal by white working and middle class people of black slaves, workers, sharecroppers and middle classes. The betrayal of the Negro, to use Rayford Logan’s phrase, is critical in every moment of state formation and legitimization in American history. Noel Ignatiev’s study How The Irish Became White and David Roediger’s Wages for Whitness are recent explanation of the consequences of the white working class’s betrayal and its role in the legitimization of whiteness. Ignatiev says, “In the combination of Southern planters and the ‘plain republicans’ of the North the Irish were to become a key element. The truth is not, as some historians would have it, that slavery made it possible to extend to the Irish the privileges of citizenship, by providing another group for them to stand on, but the reverse, that the assimilation of the Irish into the white race made it possible to maintain slavery” (1995:69).
MARY FRANCES BERRY (1994) takes the story further, urging that the US state and Constitution were forged in the struggle to contain black resistance. The logic of Berry’s position is that whiteness and the racialized state function to suppress black resistance and maintain blacks as a “sub-proletariat.” Leronne Bennett, Jr. in his work Forced Into Glory: Abraham Lincoln’s White Dream (2000) argues that through it all Lincoln was unprincipled regarding the freedom of the slaves and had he lived beyond 1864 would have, like Jefferson, slaughtered the ideals of the nation upon the alter of white supremacy. Lincoln, in Bennett’s narrative, was another of a long line of white betrayers of blacks. What is missing in Bennett’s account is that Lincoln as President was first and foremost a defender of the racialized state, and his behavior was both constrained and facilitated by that state. Berry’s account is as close as one gets in the confines of academic discourse to arguing that the US state is a racist state.
Finally, the crucial moment in defining white rights and black denial and hence updating the US Constitution to reflect the new stage of US racial and economic life was the famous Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896. Interpreting that case, Cheryl Harris (1993) insists that race and property rights define the foundation of US Constitutional law and that whiteness is essentially a form of property to protected under the Constitution.

Legal Evolutions of Whiteness
The legal evolution of whiteness begins with the three-fifths clause of the Constitution and is perfected through multiple political and Constitutional interpretations and rulings. Among these are the Dred Scott Decision (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and most notably the recent interpretations of the US Supreme Court holding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth Amendment applies equally to white men as to blacks, Native Americans and other peoples of color.
White (or American) nationalism is, in this configuration, the political manifestation of whiteness. The racialized US state is the central political organ of white power. It is, however, a complex network of relationships and socio-political forces. It is a site of intense political and ideological conflict. It is neither sui generis, nor above the political and economic realities of the historical, socio-political and ideological contexts within which it exists. Thus it is possible to observe the command and control functions of the US state as well as its mediation functions. Whereas liberal theorists generally point to the mediation or “above class” functions of the state (see John Rawls, Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia), Marxists and other radical theorists point to the command and control functions as primary to the definition of a state.
IT IS CLEAR that both radical and liberal commentators on the US state can make a case that from the standpoint of theory the US state is both liberal (in the sense of above class) and class-based. However, the deeper issue is how the state functions to configure, defend and promote race and race relations at particular historic moments. In this respect neither the liberal nor traditional radical views are adequate. What is called for is an understanding of the US state as a racialized mechanism that is the principal organizer of racialized power. As an instrument of racialized power, i.e., the power of white people over non-whites, especially black people, it functions to mediate class conflict and fissures among whites and to exert, more than not, command and control functions with respect to blacks. This situation is not only deeply contradictory, but also profoundly ironical. Blacks, the spearhead of most of the important democratic reforms in US history, have benefited least from democracy. Remaining outside of the social contract, excluded from the liberal framework constructed and defended by the state and the chief objects of the state’s command and control functions, they appear almost as a stateless people, somewhat like the Palestinians or black South Africans under apartheid. The racialized dimension of the US state, dialectically, compels its class dimension to be contingent, indeterminate and fluid. The very fluid and dynamic nature of race and whiteness, their changing modes of political and social identities, predetermine certain indeterminacy with respect to the formations and development of the racialized state. Hence, rather than being a stable entity the racialized state is dynamic, somewhat unstable and an ever evolving structure.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES in the US population, resulting from immigration and low birth rates among whites, force the need to redefine whiteness in such ways as to guarantee a white majority as a condition of legitimization of white authority. Non-black immigrants are faced with complex negotiations between anti-black racism and whiteness. Many Latinos and Asians are so positioned to become in a generation white, or at least honorary, or near-whites.
Heterarchical, or multileveled logics of social structural formation, are what we see evidenced in the formation of the racialized state in the historical setting of the US. Hence, the processes that unfold are far more complex than the hierarchical top down logics usually identified with state formation logics in Marxist and left discourse. Du Bois in Black Reconstruction identified this heterarchical logic and suggested that the strategy for the achievement of bourgeois democratic rights by black folk would require multiple tactics that took into account the fluid heterarchical nature of the state. Du Bois even suggested that black folk seen as strategic actors could alter the political landscape and in so doing manipulate time, i.e. the rhythms and sequences of events. (For Du Bois on this aspect see Lemmert [2001]. Kontopolous (1993:236) speaks of this situation as heterarchy wherein structures such as the state are determined in and through contingencies and indeterminacies. Hence the logic of racialized state formation rather than top down and hierarchical is heterarchical, meaning top down and bottom up at the same time.( n10)
THIS IS THE SITUATION within which the dynamics of state formation occur at the present, post September 11, 2001 moment; a moment of political fluidity, war, militarism and economic transformation and uncertainty.
However, the theoretical defenders of the liberal state and its potential to stand apart and mediate race and class conflict are also defenders of the notion of a colorblind state and thus are themselves blind to the historically constituted racially determined nature of the US state. It is they, in the end, not the US state, who are colorblind. This colorblindness itself, as Charles Mills points out, entrenches white privilege.( n11) In being blind to the racial nature of the state they fail to see the profound command and control functions of the state, which are overwhelmingly constructed upon and defined by the US state’s role as the defender of racialized social relationships. The liberal democratic framework should have a sign outside of its door that reads, “For Whites Only.”
Bernard Magubane (1996) shows that the racialized state in South African was constructed on the basis of a race-class dialectic. The pure class analysis, he points out, cannot explain the racial factor in its formation. However, like the US state, it was profoundly malleable and entangled in a set of contexts that changed over historical time. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction is best understood as a study of the construction, deconstruction and reformation of the racialized state in order to reestablish white power over the former slaves, the work force in general and the nation. Du Bois shows this was a necessary condition for the establishment of state monopoly capitalism and US imperialism. In his book, Race and Civilization: Rebirth of Black Centrality, Clarence J. Munford (2001) traces the ideological roots of the racialized state to Europe and European ideology. He asserts that the Euro-American state is the principal agency of white civilizational power in the modern world. As such, it is connected to more than class power, but to the more enduring cultural and civilizational patterns that are based on white supremacy.
BESIDES HISTORICAL, sociological and philosophical studies of the racialized state and state theory, the nature of mass political mobilization to legitimate the state confirms its racialized nature. Clearly the legitimization of the American state rests upon a broad white consensus and the mobilization of that consensus by the principal institutions of white power, including the main political parties–the Democratic and Republican parties–the media, religious institutions, labor organizations, right-wing organizations, even liberal organizations and women’s organizations, to name but a few.
IN FACT, the racialized state achieves legitimacy to the degree that it resolves the class, ethnic and gender problems and contradictions among white people. In other words, the state meditates these socio-economic, ethnic, gender and politico-ideological fissures in ways that races trump these fissures in the politics of the nation. In this regard, I define the mediation of class issues to mean not only economic class issues, but above all ideological class issues. Thus Du Bois’s idea of a wage for whiteness, a nonmaterial or ontological wage, is crucial to understanding the legitimization of the state. Seymour Lipset writes, “A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic sociological divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for such a development would reflect a state of conflict among groups so intense and clear cut as to rule out all possibility of compromise (1959:93).” When Lipset in this classic statement references sociological differences he is referring to economic and ideological differences among white people. In the two-party system both parties are multi-class (and in a certain way multiparty, consisting of coalitions of parties based on sectionalism, economic interests, programs and class constituencies) structures that compete to achieve the upper hand in determining the modalities by which white privilege is dispensed and defended. They cooperate to legitimize a white consensus.
Once class is no longer an issue and working-class seizure of state power is resolved, and when the state is legitimized through democratic and electoral processes, the question is what then defines the state and whom does it operate for and against.( n12) The two sources of the state’s legitimization are, first, the fear (real and imagined) of domestic unrest sparked by blacks and the global threat either from international communism in the past, or anti-imperialist and anti-globalization movements and militant Islam in the present. And second, that the subtle yet open message of the elite representatives of the racialized state is that it defends white privilege and whiteness against these domestic and foreign threats.( n13)

Du Bois and Bourgeois Democracy: A History
of the United States

DU BOIS STATES in Black Reconstruction, “The record of the Negro worker during Reconstruction presents an opportunity to study inductively the Marxian theory of the state (1992:381).” Charles Lemmert (2000:222) is right when he insists that Black Reconstruction “thinks race through in more enduringly substantial ways” than The Souls of Black Folk. It is, moreover, global in its scope and its intellectual and ideological implications. In thinking about Reconstruction, Du Bois was also thinking about the present and future of race, democracy, class conflict and the state. In Black Reconstruction he goes beyond themes that had appeared in his John Brown (1909): insurrectionary violence, the political and ideological agency of the slaves and state power. In Black Reconstruction Du Bois openly discusses the possibility of the dictatorship of the proletariat in several states of the former Confederacy, counterrevolutionary violence, the race-class dynamic and racialized democracy. He also looks at what we today would call racialized relationships of production. At the core of this set of production relationships is what he called “a wage for whiteness.” It is a work of theory and empirical research. Its point is to talk about the future. The paradigm it presents is revolutionary and transgressive. It establishes a framework for a larger revolutionary research project concerning US democracy, the racialized state and the relationship of class and class conflict to race and race conflict. It carries enormous predictive power. Which is to say, its categories of analysis provide a way to explain and indeed predict the modalities and regulatory principles of institutions, social structures and social classes and groups that make up American society.
At last, Black Reconstruction is successful as an act of ideological and theoretical displacement. It displaces liberal, social democratic and Marxist analysis of the state and democracy. In their place he proposes that race and racialized relationships of production are the organizing principles of American society. And that class taken outside of this historically constituted framework is theoretically impoverished. It is rare that so ambitious a project is so successful in realizing its intended goals, as is Black Reconstruction.
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION asserts that the twentieth century is a long century that begins with the overturn of Reconstruction; that out of this defeat comes the modern US state, modern class and race relations and so on. But more than this the book sums up the seventy-five-year historical period from 1860 to 1935, and on this basis establishes the ideological, philosophical and political framework for the struggles for civil rights and bourgeois democracy through the middle to end of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. The work insists upon the centrality of African Americans as the principal agency of progressive and revolutionary change. And points to the conservative and at times reactionary impulses that animate white working people’s consciousness.
Du Bois is the first to establish whiteness as a social category and as such a critical core dynamic in the American social structure. In the end Du Bois redefines what class analysis is. He takes it beyond class reductionism and dogmatism to recognition of the embeddedness of class in race and that classes in the US context are racialized. For black people, the class conflict and bourgeois democracy are shaped in the context of the struggle against white supremacy and for freedom. Black freedom and democracy, Black Reconstruction argues, is the beginning and end of class analysis.
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN Du Bois had done considerable study in the methods of political economy. The German social science academy distinguished itself in that it sought to join historical and political economic studies with concrete empirical research. Du Bois’s research while in Berlin reflected this, especially his study of the small and large-scale agricultural production in the American South during slavery.( n14)
This line of research unfolded throughout his career, eventuating in his notion of a racialized system of production. Political economy as understood at the end of the nineteenth century meant exactly that, the joining of economic analysis to an analysis of the state and economic and social policies. From a reformist, indeed Fichtean and Fabian standpoints, this meant using the state as an instrument of advanced and progressive consciousness and policies.( n15) Hence, socialists imbued the state with programs and policies that reflected their scientific findings and progressive ideas, geared to improve the conditions of working people. There is no doubt that Du Bois throughout his career saw this as one way to advance the immediate and practical interests of the racially oppressed black people. A clear conclusion of his 1896 work, “The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America 1638-1870,” pertains to the failure of the state to enforce the 1808 treaty outlawing the international slave trade. The practical lesson that he drew from this. study was that the state has the power to move events in one or another direction, either towards the moral good or its opposite. Hence, it is clear that Du Bois as a young Ph.D. believed that knowledge linked to state power could alter race relationships. This represented his early commitment to positivism and a scientistic sensibility. This stance perhaps reflected practical necessity given that blacks were almost completely powerless and disenfranchised and living under what was virtually a fascist dictatorship in the southern states.
DU BOIS’S PROFESSIONAL CAREER started in the period of the Nadir, when blacks had been completely deprived of civil and human rights. The justification for this denial was that blacks were less than human, without history, and had no standing as equal citizens within society. As a political text Du Bois’s 1897 speech before the American Negro Academy “The Conservation of Races” is a defense of the rights of citizenship for blacks based on their being part of human history and civilization. Likewise, the political and ideological meaning of The Souls of Black Folk should be read as a passionate defense of the civil and human rights of black folk within the context of bourgeois democracy. The argument made in Souls and “The Conservation of Races” is that blacks had made fundamental contributions to US culture and the shaping of its democracy, were in fact at once the most consistent democratic force in the nation, but ironically were themselves without full legal and human rights. He insists this was attested to by their collective strivings; making black folk the best defenders of the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.
Du Bois argues that the current situation of blacks was occasioned by the overturn of Reconstruction and the return, as he says, of blacks back toward a new form of slavery. The courts, he points out, had become the universal device for the reenslavement of blacks. Du Bois’s intellectual work is overarchingly political and confronts him not just with the color line, but the racialization of society’s hegemonic political and social institution, the state.
DU BOIS UNDERSTOOD that the modern US state was both liberal and racialized, which meant that he had observed the contradiction between expanding democratic rights for whites and the equally significant fact that the state operated as an instrument of racial subordination. This feature could be found in European states as well. The difference was that European powers primarily exercised the racialized dimension of state power in their colonies and in wars of national conquest and suppression (see Du Bois’s “African Roots of the War”). The uniqueness of the American situation is that both features were exercised within the national boundaries of the US nation-state. The liberal view is that the state constitutes a neutral player standing apart from, or above race and class, as the legal arbiter of societal relationships. The proto-fascist, authoritarian view is that the state is an open instrument of the interest of a race-class in its struggle for liberty, national consolidation and progress. These views coexist and are mutually supportive. The liberal view is almost solely associated with social contract theory and with the liberal view of the state advanced by John Rawls (1971).( n16) The proto-fascist or authoritarian view is as American as Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Lincoln.( n17)
Moreover, while present throughout Du Bois’s early works, including The Souls of Black Folk, is a clear predisposition to support the insurrectionary path to changing the racialized American state; this aspect becomes more pronounced in his writing after 1920, reaching its peak in Black Reconstruction. His view would supersede several extant socialist and communist constructions. On the one hand, his view would supersede the Fabian idea that the state plays a technical function and organizes the intellectual resources of society for the purpose of advancing the technical and social relationships of society.( n18) It would also go beyond the classical Marxist-Leninist position, that the state is the concentrated expression of the repressive power of the dominant class. In superseding these views Du Bois would insist that the Western state was racialized and thus constituted the concentrated power of the white race and hence defended existing race relationships within their national boundaries and internationally through colonialism and imperialism.
THERE EMERGES from the analytic dimension of his work the paramount role of African American political and moral agency in the context of the American republic. The slave rebellions and insurrections, the role of the Haitian Revolution and its leader, Toussaint L’Ouverture contributed to Du Bois’s conclusion that the role of the white masses in the history of resistance to repression was exaggerated by historians and had not measured up to the maroon and slave resistance. Du Bois’s startling view that the slaves refusal to work after 1862 constituted a general strike represented a revolutionary approach to American history writing. From this the sense that the crisis of slavery from 1860 to 1880 constituted a revolutionary situation and that black folk were the principal agents of revolutionary change lead logically to the hypothesis that in several southern states a “dictatorship of the proletariat” to use his language, could have possibly emerged. It is as important to examine how these ideas worked themselves out in strategy, tactics, organization and politics. The bulk of his work addressing the pressing need for blacks to achieve bourgeois democratic rights and liberties as a part of the struggle for full liberation, would require practical day-to-day organization, education and agitation.
Du Bois’s organizational work speaks above all else to his attempt to implement his ideas. In every stage of his career he was in some organization, or organizing and editing some political or scholarly journal. However, it is apparent that he fully understood that the path of bourgeois democracy for blacks would not proceed as it had in Europe or for that matter as it had for whites in the United States. It would be, in the end, a struggle for bourgeois democratic rights without the leadership of an existing or aspiring bourgeoisie. It would be as he conceptualized it in Souls a struggle for these rights by a people. The texture of this struggle was similar to what became the national liberation struggles of the mid twentieth century. At the start of the twentieth century rather than a revolutionary path to achieve these rights the reform path was the only available option available to blacks.( n19)

The Contemporary American State
THE ORIGINS of the modern American state can be traced roughly to the end of Reconstruction. The Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877 can be thought of both as a coda and the inauguration of the modern state system in the US. The South is back in the Union and blacks are being pushed back into a new form of slavery. The US is again a continental nation. America’s victory in the Spanish American War is the nodal point in the political and ideological consolidation of the US state as racialized and imperialist; seeking global reach. Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency (1901-1909) and with it the style of the strong man executive who is at once a man of action, vigor, and an intellectual defined the political and personal characteristics associated with contemporary American executive leadership. The presidency from Theodore Roosevelt’s time until now has usurped Congressional power, usually justifying this by a reference to one or another crisis that demanded centralized state leadership.
By this time the US was second only to England as an industrial nation and sea power. The two-party system became the institutional framework through which ideological and psychological mobilization of the masses occurred. Appeals to whiteness, Manifest Destiny( n20) and scientific racism( n21) were fashioned to give a progressivist cover to this mobilization. (See Audrey Smedley, Race in North America: Origins and Evolution of a Worldview [191] and Tukufu Zuberi, Thicker Than Blood: How Racial Statistics Lie, [chapter 1]) The centrality of this period in defining the twentieth-century US nation-state is being examined by any number of establishment historians. Warren Zimmerman’s First Great Triumph: How Americans Made Their Country a Great Power tells a tale of the men who changed US state policy and ideology in such ways as to prepare it to assume a role on the global stage. I detect a direct lineage to the unilateralist policies and present war of the current Bush Administration from that period and the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.
WITH THE PRESIDENCY of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, the state as the guarantor of the economy’s health and as the principle regulator of social and economic processes was established. Keynesianism became the policy and philosophical framework for this new state interventionism. At the same time Congress’s power became profoundly diminished. The Cold War occasioned a renewal of the political and ideological rationale for the US state as the instrument of US imperialism and the global reach of its power. The nineteenth-century doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the trope that white Americans were a chosen people, became a global doctrine in the struggle against “communism” This was best enunciated in the Truman Doctrine, which informs each stage of the American struggle against “the threat of communism.” The scope of Manifest Destiny included the vast majority of the world’s peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Social Darwinist aspects of this doctrine were clear to any who would dare to look. Twentieth-century post World War II Manifest Destiny targeted Africa as the principal site of the Cold War conflict.
THE CURRENT PHASE of the formation of the US state begins roughly with the Reagan Administration. The balance between the Welfare and Warfare aspects of the US state, which had been maintained between 1945 and 1980, was upset in favor of the military-industrial side. One could speak of the period up to the first Reagan Administration as one where the policy and philosophical line on the state’s role in the economy as a Keynesian-neo-classical synthesis wherein the state serves the free market system and at the same time maintains the balance between classes and social strata within the white population.( n22) It was, therefore, a barrier to class conflict among whites, while holding to its racialized, repressive and control dimension vis-à-vis blacks. Thus, the twenty-three year period of shifting the balance of state power increasingly to the military industrial and police dimensions of the state has been completed. The process leading to this moment has been uninterrupted. Both parties supported it, albeit, with differing rhetoric, programs and tactics for achieving it. As such the competition dimension of the two-party system was lessened and the differences are today so slight as to be inconsequential. Milton Friedmanite neo-liberal economics prevail. Keynesianism as policy is either severely compromised or dead.
Empire, War and the Social Science
IN THE FACE OF THE CRISIS in the world system and the war and empire strategy of the Clinton and Bush Administrations, the social sciences are in crisis; a crisis which most professional social scientists seem to have no awareness of. American social science has been fashioned by the exigencies of the Cold War. As a consequence, American social scientists have tended to conservatism and forms of professionalism which self-define them away from political and ideological engagement with the state. This approach has served the overall needs of white supremacy and colonialism. The question is which side of the struggle for global democracy the social sciences will stand.
Franz Fanon (1967), Michel Foucault 1972), Edward Said (1978), V.Y. Mudimbe (1988), and Lewis Gordon (1995) have drawn attention to the crisis. Fanon, for example, demonstrated that the European social and philosophical sciences evidence not the superiority of European man, but the crisis of European man. He pulled the mask off the claims to reason and objectivity of European science. They were, he tells us, mere manifestations of the colonial and racist predispositions of European thought. Foucault’s contribution to understanding, if not resolving the crisis, was to place the social scientist as subject/agent at the center of interrogation. In so doing the field, or discursive space, becomes a legitimate area of investigation, and not above the fray. By establishing knowledge as contingent, conditioned and underdetermined, he focuses upon the agents of knowledge production and their discursive praxis and the ways discursive formations come about. Foucault believes that European social thought is in crisis; unlike Fanon he believes the crisis is resolvable on European terms through epistemic rupture. Fanon allows that only through revolutionary rupture based upon the revolutionary agency of the colonized masses will the crisis be resolved. Said and Mudimbe show the anti-Asian and anti-African moorings of European thought. Said interrogated the claims to objectivity of European knowledge especially about the “Oriental” Other; showing the imagined space that frames European knowledge, in which the Other is imagined to justify European hegemony and colonialism. European knowledge is self-referential and egotistic, and operates in a circular and insular manner to justify European hegemony and colonialism.
Du BOIS was a committed social scientist. He was deeply invested in the project of scientifically explaining human relationships, particularly race relationships. His bold and cutting edge approach to the human sciences displaced the old eugenics and Social Darwinist approaches and anticipated a good part of what is contemporary human science. In Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace (1945) he observed that the rise of the US to the hegemonic economic and military power in the world did not occasion a democratic efflorescence. In fact it occasioned the opposite. The situation of the US as the main threat to peace and democracy compelled Du Bois to look anew at his political direction, but also to reconsider the ideological, political and epistemological foundations of the human sciences. He thus found himself in a situation of epistemic rupture in relationship to the social sciences. In their majority American social scientists were moving to the right and retreating into new forms of positivism and he was moving to the left and searching for new modes to critically investigate the epistemologies, methods and politics of the socials sciences. At the core of his renewed investment in social research was that uppermost must be the transformation of world economic and political relationships. For the human sciences to be truly human they must be global, they must be rooted in actual history and begin with the anti-colonial liberation struggles. At this stage in his life Du Bois had superseded the Fabian orientation of his early career. He now understood the strategic necessity of the seizure of the state by the oppressed. Since the racialized state functioned to uphold white supremacy and colonialism on a global scale, in dialectical fashion he grasped that the power of the oppressed would have to be actualized in state power.
To answer the question what is to be done, a study and extension of Du Bois’s understanding of the racialized state is paramount. The situation of anti-democratic and white supremacist assault upon the people’s rights is in a very profound sense the outcome of America’s racial history. To defend bourgeois democracy demands either radical reforms of the existing state system or its complete overthrow. Du Bois at various moments in his career argued both positions and suggested tactics, strategies and organizational modalities to achieve each.( n23)

Footnotes
(n1.) In Foreign Affairs (November/December 2002:149) Richard Holbrooke, in examining a body of new revisionist scholarship writes:
Max Boot, for example, has shown recently in The Savage Wars of Peace that, contrary to the ‘Powell Doctrine’ and the views of the current leaders of the American military, the United States has conducted endless small military interventions with success throughout its history. Walter Russell Mead, in Special Providence, has identified four different themes in American foreign policy and found continuity stretching back to the founding of the republic. Looking at events that straddle the Cold War but from a wholly post-Cold War perspective, Samantha Power has offered up ‘A Problem from Hell,’ her wholly original examination of consistent American failure to act in the face of genocide. And Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command is a somewhat different sort of book: a study of four historical events designed to prove the indisputable thesis that war is still too important to leave to the generals.
What Holbrooke suggests about this scholarship is that America has been a warfare state since the beginning of the twentieth century. Zimmerman (2002) concurs and persuasively argues that the US entered upon a path of imperialism and global conquest as policy from the start of the twentieth century.
(n2.) Of Du Bois’s time in Germany and his professors Gustav Schmoller, Adolf Wagner and Heinrich von Treitschke he says (1940/1986: 588) “I began to see the race problem in America, the problem of the peoples of Africa and Asia, and the political development of Europe as one.” Barkin (Fall 2000:86) argues that Du Bois’s attraction to von Treitschke, the ultranationalist and racist, is explained by von Treitschke’s recognition that lynching showed that blacks remained outside the law, which pointed to the feebleness of American law, institutions and democracy.
(n3.) In Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace, Du Bois insists, “…The mounting pressure of popular demand for democratic methods must be counted on throughout the world as popular intelligence rises. Its greatest successful opponent today is not Fascism, whose extravagance has brought its own overthrow, but rather imperial colonialism, where the disfranchisement of the mass of people has reduced millions to tyrannical control without any vestige of democracy (1945:84).” In The World and Africa, speaking of the global economy based upon capitalism and colonialism, Du Bois says that the global economy is a social process and “if not socially controlled sinks to anarchy with every possible crime of irresponsible greed. Such was the African slave trade, and such is the capitalistic system it brought to full flower.” He goes on, “A process of incredible ingenuity for supplying human wants became in its realization a series of brutal crimes.” He then insists that if capitalism can reform itself “by means other than Communism… Communism need not be feared.” However, “if a world of ultimate democracy, reaching across the color line and abolishing race discrimination, can be accomplished by the method laid down by Karl Marx, then that method deserves to be triumphant no matter what we think or do (1947:258).”
(n4.) David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century (2000: 496-553) chastises Du Bois for moving to the “far left” in his later years. Gerald Horne (1986:289), contrary to Lewis, argues, “The trip from the NAACP in 1944 to the Communist Party in 1961 was not as convoluted as some might suspect; their immediate goals were closely congruent…The black community was probably the most left sector of the United States polity, and Du Bois was a leader of both Blacks and the left.” In The Autobiography Du Bois declares, “I have studied socialism and communism long and carefully in lands where they are practiced and in conversation with their adherents, and with wide reading. I now state my conclusion frankly and clearly: I believe in communism. I mean by communism a planned way of life in the production of wealth and work designed for building a state whose object is the highest welfare of its people and not merely the profit of a part” (57). This is a logical progression of his theory of the color line, capitalism and the state and that to alter world economic and political relationships the world system, especially its capitalist part, would have to be radically transformed.
(n5.) Franz Fanon (1967) makes a similar point. His critique of European socialism is precisely at the point that it retreats from an all-out attack upon the color line and white supremacy. He concludes, therefore, that the revolutionary initiative in world terms has shifted to the “Third World” and the anti-colonial struggles. At one point Fanon insists that the socialism imagined by the representatives of the Western working class is of a socialism of luxury, which would make imperative some form of neocolonialism.
(n6.) See “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html): “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/): “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention” (http://www.Whitehouse.gov/news/release/2002/). Here we have laid out the policy of global military domination and the strategy for enduring war and preemptive warfare.
(n7.) It should be noted that American history lacks a Jacobin or revolutionary democratic tradition, except among African Americans. In general, progressivism in the American setting has meant, in the main, progressivism for whites. This has been seen in the trade union, women’s rights and radical movements among whites.
(n8.) Slaves were the principal form of property in the period of the early accumulation of capital in the Unites States. The slaves occupy a peculiar, almost paradoxical, space in the political economy of world capitalism. The slaves are a proletariat who as human beings are the property of their “employers.” This against the classic European situation where the employer owns the labor power of the worker, not the worker him/herself. This slave condition and capitalist production based on slave labor produced a situation of super exploitation.
(n9.) David Roediger (1991:12) correctly interprets the meaning of Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction, pointing out that the book is organized around issues of race and class, and that in teasing out these issues Du Bois “continually creates jarring, provocative theoretical images.” Roediger points out that at the center of the problem of the class struggle in the US is the problem of whiteness, or a wage for whiteness; as Du Bois calls it, “a public and psychological wage.” Charles Lemmert (2000) insists that Du Bois in writing the history of Reconstruction was actually writing the history of the present and future. The point is that Black Reconstruction and Du Bois’s theory of the class struggle and class formation speaks as much to the twenty-first as to the nineteenth century.
(n10.) On strategic actors and the manipulation of time see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Kontopolous (1993:236) helps us conceptualize heterarchics. He says, “The combination of the dimensions of constraining, enabling and availing makes it possible to see each level, at least in reference to the top down aspect of interlevel relations as semi-independent and yet interdependent with others. And as it must be clear by now, we can extend this notion of availing to all level connections, thus positing considerable ‘degrees of indeterminacy’ or ‘degrees of creative discretion’ evidence [a] in the rise and differential strengthening of corporate and collective actors and forms of structures initiated by them at the quasi-global level; [b] in the formation of a variety of conjunctions and novel institutional forms, techniques of domination, technologies of invention and monopolization, and various forms of bio-power developed within them; and [c] in the emergence, within these novel settings, of a number of improvised or unauthorized strategies and practices, articulated and used by virtuosic strategic agents.”
(n11.) Charles Mills (1997:77) writes, “The black philosopher Bill Lawson comments on the deficiencies of the conceptual apparatus of traditional liberalism, which has no room for the peculiar post-Emancipation status of blacks, simultaneously citizens and non-citizens. The black philosopher of law Anita Allen remarks on the irony of standard American philosophy of law texts, which describe the universe in which ‘all humans are paradigm rights holders’ and see no need to point out that the actual US record is somewhat different.”
(n12.) Lipset (1996) makes the point that the US state and nation are basically conservative. He says that this conservatism during the New Deal period took on a social democratic tinge ( 38). Post-war economic growth lessened the class tensions that defined the Great Depression and returned the nation to its traditional conservatism. I would add that the conservatism is now tinged, to use Lipset’s word, with reactionism. This shift to the right and far right in American conservatism fuels the new drive towards global hegemony and empire.
(n13.) An aspect of this ideological function of the state is its treatment historically and in the present of black masculinity.
(n14.) David Levering Lewis (1993:143) says of this time in Du Bois’s life,” what kept Du Bois busiest was research for his seminar thesis, “Der Gross und Klein Betrieb des Ackerbaus, in den Sudstaaten der Vereinigten Staaten, 1840-1890,” or “The Large and Small-scale System of Agriculture in the Southern United States, 1840-1890. “Although he was able to build on his work under Hart at Harvard, the bulk of the essay was based on new reading, as well as new thinking about history and economics from, so to speak, the bottom up. Lewis says the two principal influences upon Du Bois in Berlin were Professors Gustav yon Schmoller and Adolph Wagner. Their theory of the state and the economy, Lewis tells us, came from Fichte’s notion that competing economic interests were kept in equilibrium by an intelligent state. This Fichtean idea of the relationship of the state to social and economic forces will find its way into Souls, but has all but disappeared by the time of Black Reconstruction. By this time the state is conceptualized as the instrument of white power.
(n15.) Adolph Reed (1997) identifies Du Bois’s early political thinking as within the bounds of Fabianism and its idea that science and scientific programs could act to advance progressivism from within the state.
(n16.) Modern communisms as well as modern social democracy emerge from the late nineteenth-century debates over the nature of the state, rather than over class per se. It is my view that while Hegel is a central influence, through his idea that the state transcends society and as such represents it (a view that seemed to inform the Boris Kautsky’s view of a “pure” democracy which resulted from the democratic evolution of society), Kant’s view that the state is both a moral and ethical arbiter of societal conflict has also left an enduring influence upon both social democratic and liberal theorists of the state.
(n17.) The American state is indeed a peculiar democratic institution. Like American society it is “both/and” rather than “either/or.” Hence, while democracy expanded throughout the nineteenth century for whites, repression and genocide increased for Native Americans and blacks. White populism as manifested by the presidency and ideology of Andrew Jackson stood for expanding rights for whites and the Trail of Tears for Native Americans and Fugitive Slave Act to protect the rights of slave owners. In the late nineteenth century, populism, as with the main thrust of trade unionism, signified to all sides of the “class struggle” expanding white identity and white rights.
(n18.) Adolph Reed (1997) discusses ways that Du Bois understood the state in the early part of his career as an instrument of altering race relationships in the US. This, Reed suggests, was an essentially technocratic view of the state and its functions, especially in addressing the color line. Hence, Reed sees Du Bois’s early effort as attempting to merge Fabianism to the struggle against racial oppression.
(n19.) Here there are two questions in the tactical and strategic struggles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One is the stance of Booker T. Washington and later Marcus Garvey, who not only trivialized the struggle to realize and uphold bourgeois or civil rights to blacks, but also attempted to substitute what appeared as an economic program for them. The other was the socialist-Marxist view to substitute the struggle for bourgeois democracy with the struggle for socialism, formulated, as the class struggle is the struggle for black rights. Each side seems to disregard the nature of racialized state power.
(n20.) Smedley (1993:191) points out that the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority became a central part of American racial thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She continues:
It also became part of the American mythology associated with republicanism, Protestantism, democracy, laissez-faire economic theory, progress and empire building. The superior “racial” traits of Anglo-Saxons became a stimulus for American expansion. Indeed the myth was at the heart of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, by which white Americans expressed belief in themselves as a “chosen people,” destined to dominate others. Over time, many non-English whites also assimilated this myth because it provided the basis for the general ideology of white supremacy.
Important to the new racism of the early twentieth century was “scientific racism” or eugenics, fathered by Francis Galton. Tukufu Zuberi (2001:53) points out that “Eugenics required an essential difference among humans in order to justify racial and class stratification.” Zuberi (54) then continues, “He (Francis Galton) believed (intelligence) was biologically inherent and that Africans and other people of color were inferior in intelligence to the lighter skinned Europeans.”
(n21.) The idea of white Americans as chosen people is not adequate to meet the ideological needs of rising American imperialism. To appeal to progressivism and American optimism there was a need for a rational or scientific addendum to the chosen people mythological narrative to justify the white American nation’s status in the world. Hence, Manifest Destiny and scientific racism combine to produce a credible explanation of the rights of white Americans to dominate “lesser” peoples.
(n22.) The notion of a Keynesian neo-classical synthesis I take from Irina Osadchaya, From Keynes to Neo-classical Synthesis: A Critical Analysis (1974). She argues that neo-Keynesianism, or the Keynesian neoclassical synthesis attempts to take the static Keynesian model and make it dynamic by merging macro theory with micro, or market, economic theories. Robert Skidelsky in his John Maynard Keynes, The Economist as Savior, 1920-1937, (1992) insists that Keynes’ General Theory was as much vision as economic logic and that the disconnection between economic logic and vision has left his followers attempting to sort out what Keynesianism is in terms of state policy, or macroeconomic theory and policy. In this respect, while Keynesianism can be considered a way of thinking about the economy in new ways, just as Nietzsche thought about morality in new ways, the actual modeling of the post World War II economy was left to neo-Keynesians and those who promoted a Keynesian neoclassical synthesis.
(n23.) In this regard the views of Clarence J. Munford (1996,2001) and Bernard Magubane (1996) are critical. Both are “revisionist” theorists of the state and both draw upon Marxist class notions, but supersede them by arguing that the racialized dynamic is the core or central dynamic in state formation in the West. Munford asserts, “the modern Western state has legitimized white racism while constantly modernizing it” (2001:111). Magubane asserts that the South African example leads him to concur with Fanon and Césaire who regard fascism “not as an aberration, but as a logical outcome of European colonialism brought home to roost.”

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